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CHAPI'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
A large number of empirical studies concerning the relationship 
between market structure and economic performance have been completed 
since Joe Bain's 1951 article. 1 Weiss, for example, reports in a 1971 
paper that there had been "at least thirty-two tests of some form of 
the classic profit-determination hypothesis over the last 18 years, 
and the number seems to be accelerating if anything." 2 The primary 
issue in these studies is the degree to which variations in economic 
performance are caused by differences in market structure. The uni-
variate studies3 typically generate a strong to weak relationship 
between market structure (measured by seller concentration) and 
economic performance (measured by profit rates or price-cost margins). 4 
In multivariate studies this relationship has again been isolated, 5 
although some exceptions have been noted. 6 
Additional knowledge of this structure-performance relationship 
is important for antitrust policy recommendations. For example, in 
1968 the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy presented recom-
mendations designed to strengthen antitrust statutes. One major 
proposal included was the "Concentrated Industries Act" which would 
search out all "oligopoly industries"? and bring legal proceedings 
against all "oligopoly firms" 8 within those industries. The goal of 
1 
2 
this act would be to lower the market shares of individual firms to 
below 12 per cent. These recommendations were said to be based on the 
existing evidence, both theoretical and empirical, about the relation-
ship between market structure and economic performance. This evidence 
was described by the Task Force as follows: 
The adverse effects of persistent concentration on output 
and price find some confirmation in various studies that 
have been made of return on capital in major industries. 
These studies have found a close association between high 
levels of concentration and persistently high rates of 
return on capital, particularly in those industries in 
which the largest four firms account for more than 60% 
of the sales. High profit rates in individual firms or 
even in particular industries are of course consistent 
with competition. They may reflect innovation, exceptional 
efficiency, or growth in demand outrunning the expansion 
in supply. Above-average profits for additional resources 
and expanded output in the industry, which, in due time 
should return profits to a normal level. It is the per-
sistence of high profits over extended time periods and 
over whole industries rather than in individual firms that 
suggest artificial restraints on output and the absence 
of fully effective competition. The correlation of 
evidence of this kind with very hi~h levels of concen-
tration appears to be significant. 
Shortly thereafter, this same issue was reexamined by the Task 
Force on Productivity and Competition headed up by George Stigler. 10 
The Stigler Report rejects the view that seller concentration leads to 
antitrust violations. The report observes: 
Numerous statistical studies have been made of the 
relationship between concentration and rates of return 
on investment, and these studies generally yield positive 
but loose relationships: concentration is not a major 
determinant of differences among industries in profitability 
although it may be sometimes a significant factor •••• 
The correlation between concentration and profitability 
is weak, and many factors besides the number of firms in a 
market appear to be relevant to the competitiveness of 
their behavior. 
3 
Purpose of the Study 
The general goal of the study is to provide additional evidence 
regarding this structure-performance controversy and to provide esti-
mates of costs of monopoly power. The purposes of the study are (1) to 
examine the structure-performance hypothesis using the price-cost 
margin as the dependent variable and 1967 data, (2) to compare the 
outcomes to other studies in the area, (3) to estimate the monopoly 
welfare loss by four-digit industry classification, and (4) to make 
policy recommendations suggested by the results of this study. 
Organization of the Study 
The material in this study is arranged under six chapter headings. 
The structure-performance model is developed in Chapter II. In Chapter 
III the empirical results from testing the theoretical model are 
presented. In Chapter IV a model to measure welfare loss is presented. 
Chapter V covers the empirical results of the welfare loss model. 
The final chapter consists of a general summary of the problem and 
conclusions of the study. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Joe S. Bain, "Relation of Profit Rates to Industry Concentration," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65 (August, 1951), pp. 293-324. 
2Leonard Weiss, "Quantitative Studies of Industrial Organization," 
Frontiers~ Quantitative Economics, Michael D. Intriligator, ed. 
(Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 362-403. 
3see, for example, Bain, pp. 293-324, H. Michael Mann, "Seller 
Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty 
Industries," Review of Economics and Statistics, 48 (August, 1966), 
pp. 296-307, and Norman H. Collins and Lee E. Preston, Concentration 
..ill!.2. Price-Cost Margins in Manufacturing Industries (Berkeley, 1968). 
4The exception to this is George J. Stigler, Capital ..ill!.2. Rates~ 
Return in Manufacturing Industries (Princeton, 1963). 
5Joe S. Bain, Barriers to~ Competition (Cambridge, 1956), 
pp. 296-307; W. S. Comanor and T. A. Wilson, "Advertising, Market 
Structure and Performance," Review ~ Economics i!!!S! Stati sties, 49 
(November, 1967), pp. 423-440; and Norman R. Collins and Lee E. 
Preston, "Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure," Review of 
Economics ..ill!.2. Statistics, 51 (August, 1969), pp. 271-286. 
6 James V. Koch, "Industry Market Structure and Industry Price-Cost 
Margins," Industrial Organization Review, 2, No. 4 (1974), pp. 186-194. 
7An oligopoly industry is defined as one in which "(i) any four or 
fewer firms had an aggregate market share of 70% or more during at 
least seven of the ten and four of the most recent five base years; 
and (ii) the average aggregate market share during the five most recent 
base years of the four firms with the largest average market shares 
during those base years amounted to at least 80% of the average 
aggregate market share of those same four firms during the five most 
recent base years decline by 20% or more from such average sales during 
the preceding five base years" Phil Neal et al., "White House Task 
Force on Antitrust Policy," Antitrust~ and Economics Review, 2 
(Winter, 1968), p. 68. 
8nefined as "· •• a firm engaged in commerce whose market share 
in an oligopoly industry during at least two of the three most recent 
base years exceeded 15%." Ibid. 
9Ibid., p. 28. 
10 George J. Stigler et al., "Report on the Task Force on Pro-
ductivity and Competition," Antitrust Law~ Economics Review, 2 
(Spring, 1969), pp. 13-~0. 
11 Ibid.' p. 26. 
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CHAPI'ER II 
STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE MODEL 
Structural Variables 
The basic hypothesis to be tested in this study is that, ceteris 
paribus, price-cost margins for industries are functionally related to 
the market structures of the industries. The specific independent 
structural variables that this study will consider are: 
1. Seller concentration (CR), 
2. Industry rate of growth in demand (D), 
J. Barriers to entry (PRD or MES), 
4. Geographic market (GM), 
5. Import competition (I), and 
6. Capital intensity (KO or TAO). 
Seller Concentration 
Economic theory implies that the higher the degree of concen-
tration, the greater the probability that firms will be able to 
collude to raise prices above long-run average costs. 1 One hypothesis 
to be examined is that price-cost margins are positively related with 
the level of seller concentration. 2 Seller concentration will be 
measured by the share of the four largest firms in the industry's 
total value of shipments for 1967. 
6 
7 
Industry Rate of Growth 
In addition, it is hypothesized the price-cost margin, ceteris 
paribus, is positively related to the growth of industry demand. Firms 
in industries experiencing rapid growth in demand (relative to in-
creases in unit costs) will experience widening price cost margins 
because they are less likely to face the competitive pressures found 
in slow-growth sectors. 3 Also, in concentrated industries facing a 
slow growth or decline in demand, collusive joint-profit maximization 
pricing behavior may break down resulting in lower price-cost margins. 4 
Growth in industry demand will be measured by the percentage change in 
industry value of shipments between 1963 and 1967. 
Barriers to Entry 
Factors that impose costs on potential new entrants not incurred 
by existing firms are often referred to as barriers to entry. The 
effect of these barriers is to make it more costly for new firms to 
enter the production and sale of a product. The hypothesis to be 
tested is that price-cost margins are greater in those industries in 
which barriers to entry are higher. Two sources of barriers which will 
be investigated are (1) product differentiation (PRD), and (2) econo-
mies of plant size (MES). 
Product differentiation reflects consumer preferences for pro-
ducts of particular manufacturers. When product differentiation exists 
in a market, new firms must undertake proportionately larger sales 
campaigns to attract customers at given prices than established firms 
must maintain; alternatively the new entrant must undercut established 
firms' current prices for the product in order to gain sales 
in the market. 
Product differentiation will also make the demand curve faced by 
the firm less elastic. Increased product differentiation will rotate 
a demand curve from DD to D 1D 1 as shown in Figure 1. As the demand 
curve becomes less elastic (more inelastic), and given a marginal cost 
curve, a firm's profit maximizing price will be increased. 5 Joe Bain 
has noted that 
the most important barrier to entry discovered by detailed 
study is probably product di~ferentiation • • • • The most 
single important basis of product differentiation in the 
consumer-goods category is apparently advertising; in all 
cases it appears in significant volume.6 
The ratio of industry advertising to industry sales (advertising 
intensity) is used, whenever possible, as a proxy for product differ-
entiation. The reasoning is based on the idea that advertising 
expenditures are a prime source of differentiation in consumer good 
industries. 7 
Data on advertising expenditures are not readily available at the 
four-digit SIC level. Information for the Food and Kindred Products 
group (SIC 20) is developed from advertising data reported by the IRS 
at approximately the three-digit level. In addition, figures from 
Advertising Age for the 100 leading advertisers is used to modify the 
IRS data to reflect differentials in advertising expenditures at the 
four-digit leve1. 8 For industries outside SIC 20 a producer-consumer 
goods classification is used as a proxy for product differentiation. 
Consumer goods industries are assumed to reflect the presence of 
produce differentiation and producer goods industries reflect the 
lack of product differentiation. 9 
8 
Price 
Per 
Unit 
D 0 &..-.,.._...;... ___ ___;. ____________________ . j 
Quantity Per Unit of Time 
Figure 1. The E££ect o£ Product Di££erentiation 
on the Demand Curve 
9 
10 
Barriers to entry may also arise from economies of plant size. 
Economies of plant size result when per unit costs of production 
decline as the size of a plant is increased. Figure 2 illustrates a 
long-run average cost curve (LRAC) facing a firm in a given industry. 
The firm will gain lower per unit costs as it expands from small output 
levels toward output OD. The LRAC curve is horizontal beyond OD, 
reflecting a constant cost industry. In this industry, economies of 
size are significant enough to make it difficult for many firms to 
serve the market and continue to achieve the minimum efficient size 
(MES) of plant (equal to output OD). If a new entrant must produce at 
a level of output that is a sizable fraction of the entire market 
(assumed to be equal to OE), his entry will affect market price. The 
manner in which market price is affected depends on the response of 
. t' f' 10 ex1s 1ng 1rms. Assume that the existing firms' response to a new 
entry is to maintain the same output at the initial leve1. 11 The 
additional output that is produced by the new entrant will lower market 
price. In Figure 3, the entrant's cost curve (AC) has been shifted so 
that his zero output corresponds with the current output of existing 
firms (OE). Figure 3 shows the new entrant producing the quantity EF 
and making a normal profit at price P0 • The limit price (entry 
deterring price) is PL. Any pre-entry price lower than PL will dis-
courage entry of new firms. In summary, when economies of plant size 
are present and limit the number of efficient firms in an industry, it 
is likely that price will be set above the competitive level. The 
hypothesis is that price-cost margins will be positively associated 
with economies of plant size. 
Price 
Per 
Unit 
11 
~------------------------~ AC 
0~--------~~------------------------~-----------
D E 
Quantity Per Unit pf Time 
Figure 2. The Long Run Average Cost Curve 
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Figure J. Limit Pricing and Price-Cost Differences 
AC 
13 
Three different measures of economies of size will be used. The 
first approach was suggested by George Stigler: 
Classify the firms in an industry by size, and calculate 
the share of industry output coming from each class over 
time. If the share of a given class falls, it is 
relatively inefficient, and in general is more inefficient 
the more rapidly the share falls. 12 
This technique is called the survivor principle. 13 Using this approach, 
minimum efficient size of plant (MES) is defined as the smallest 
establishment size class which increased its share of total industry 
value added by one per cent or more over a five year period. Estimates 
using this approach will be labeled MES 1. 
Another estimate is derived by taking those plants in the single 
largest Census employment-size category, and expressing the output of 
that "average" plant as a fraction of the output of the industry as a 
whole. This technique is one suggested by Bain14 and later used by 
Esposito15 and will be designated as MES 2. 
A third estimate for MES has been suggested by Comanor and 
W"l 16 1 son. The measure is based on the average plant size among the 
largest plants accounting for 50 per cent of industry output. This 
"average" plant size is divided by total output and expressed as a 
percentage. It will be symbolized by MES J. 
Geographic Market 
Concentration data used in this study are generated on a nation-
wide basis. Thus, where markets are regionalized the concentration 
measures will tend to understate the degree of monopoly power present 
in a particular industry. In order to take into account the regional 
market, an index of geographic dispersion is used. The geographic 
14 
market index (GM) will be given by the radius (in miles) within which 
80 per cent of the total tonnage of a four-digit industry is shipped. 
The value of GM will vary directly with the maximum distance shipped; 
that is, for a national market, GM will be higher than for localized 
markets. 17 The expectation is that, given a level of concentration in 
the national markets, price-cost margins will be greater in industries 
that are regionally segmented. 
Import Competition 
The role of the foreign trade sector in the structure-performance 
relationship has not been examined except in studies by Esposito and 
Esposito18 and Khalilyadeb-Shirayi. 19 The presence of foreign compe-
tition, it may be argued, will reduce the market .power of firms within 
. d t 20 an 1n us ry. The hypothesis is that the larger the import sector, 
ceteris paribus, the smaller will be price-cost margins. The size of 
the import sector will be measured by the amounts of imports as a 
percentage of total domestic sales. Information on imports will be 
21 
obtained from the Bureau of the Census. 
Capital Intensity 
The sixth structural variable to be considered is that of capital 
intensity. Specifically, since .available data sources contain figures 
for current cost, but not capital costs, in industries that are 
relatively capital-intensive the ratio of profits to current costs 
would be expected to be greater than in industries that are less 
't 1 . t . 22 cap1 a -1n ens1ve. Thus, the hypothesis to be examined is that the 
greater the capital-intensity of an industry, the higher will be the 
15 
price-cost margins. Two alternative measures of capital intensity 
will be employed. The first is the capital output ratio (KO) which 
was first used by Collins and Preston23 and later used by other 
writers. 24 The second measure is also a capital to output ratio which 
uses as a proxy for capital (TAO) a measure of total assets reported on 
balance sheets of corporations. The. merits of these two separate 
measures of capital intensity will be compared. 
The Price-Cost Margin 
Under conditions of pure competition, each firm employs least cost 
combinations of resoures and produces an allocatively efficient output 
where price equals marginal cost. In contrast, firms operating in 
imperfect markets sell their outputs at prices above marginal cost and 
buy resources at prices below the value of marginal product. Hence, 
relative market prices are unreliable indicators of relative scarcities 
and relative demands; thus, firms, using market prices as guides, may 
make socially undesirable decisions. That is, firms producing in 
imperfect markets will tend to produce too little and utilize too few 
resources. The result of output restriction is that an extra dollar's 
worth of resources produces more than a dollar's worth of output (price 
marginal cost) in a monopoly, and exactly a dollar.' s worth of output 
under pure competition. Thus, reallocating resources from a monopoly 
25 
to a competitive industry would increase the value of total output. 
The dependent variable in this study is the price-cost margin 
(PM). The PM may be stated in terms of total revenue (price times 
quantity) and total cost (average cost times quantity). If total 
costs are defined to include a normal profit, then, in the long-run 
equilibrium, the total revenue-total cost ratio would have a value of 
unity for purely competitive firms, and reach an upper limit for a 
26 
single firm monopoly. However, since available data measure only 
16 
accounting costs, then the minimum ratio, greater than one for a purely 
competitive industry, would indicate the gross margin necessary to 
generate a "normal profit." Greater relative differences between 
prices and cost would indicate the presence of "excess profits." 
The price-cost margin (PM) has been used in several studies as a 
f 11 . ff. . . 27 measure o a ocat1ve e ,1c1ency. The price-cost margin is only one 
of several indicators of industry profitability. Rates of return using 
either total assets or stockholders' equity, have been used extensively 
28 by other authors. A comparison of the PM with rate of return on 
assets <rr/A) or rate of return on stockholder's equity Crr/E) reveals 
that (1) when the rate of return measure (either ~/A or ~/E) indicates 
excess profits, so will the PM, and (2) when the PM indicates excess 
profits, a rate of return measure may or may not be in agreement. This 
is illustrated in Figure 4. In part (a) of Figure 4, P )' AC > MC at 
a 
the profit-maximizing output Q • The PM and either rate of return 
a 
measure would show that excess profits are present. In part (b) of 
Figure 4, Pb = AC)MC at the profit-maximizing output Qb. Since 
Pb = AC, either rate of return measures, ~/A or rr;E, would indicate 
that no excess profits are present. However, since Pb~ MC, the PM 
will be positive indicating that excess profits did exist. Finally, 
in part (c) of Figure 4, a firm is depicted under conditions of constant 
costs (i.e., LRMC = AC); in this situation, the disagreement between the 
PM and rate of return measures disappears. 
b. 
Price 
Per 
Unit 
Price 
Per 
Unit 
Price 
Per 
Unit 
~ Quantity Per Unit of Time 
c. p 
c 
LRVC "' !.RMC • AC 
Qc Quantity Per Unit or Time 
Figure 4. Price-Cost Margins, Rates of Return and 
Allocative Efficiency 
17 
18 
The calculation of the rate of return requires as many adjustments 
and assumptions as does PM. 29 The major advantages of the PM are: 
1. It can be calculated at the industry level for a large sample 
2. 
3. 
f :f d . 't . d t . 30 o our- 1g1 1n us r1es. 
The PM is related to a theoretical model. 
31 It is closely correlated with the rate of r.eturn. 
The basic limitations of the PM are: 
1. Elasticity of demand must be the same in all industries. For 
example, for producers with some degree of monopoly power, the ratio of 
marginal cost to price is a function of the elasticity of demand. Since 
MR p (1 -! ) and, assuming profit maximizing behavior (i.e., 
MR = MC), it follows that MC 
= P(l- ~) , or ~C (1 ~)· Thus, the 
greater the price elasticity of demand (in absolute value), the greater 
the ratio of marginal cost to price. Thus, in industries with monopoly 
power, PM should vary inversely with the (absolute value) price 
elasticity of demand. There is no adequate solution to this problem 
since reliable estimates of industry demand elasticities are not 
available. Thus, the study assumes that the price elasticity of demand 
is the same for all industries; or, alternatively, the relationship 
between the price elasticity and seller concentration must be the 
same. 
32 
2. Capital costs must be included in the analysis since, in 
long-run equilibrium, if rates of return on total assets were equalized 
among industries, the ratio of profits to current costs would be higher 
in more capital intensive industries. 33 
3. The observations are short-run in nature and, thus, may 
fl t . t :f d. . 1 . b . 34 re ec var1ous s ages o 1sequ1 1 r1um. 
19 
4. In industries where a high degree of monopoly power is present, 
a part of the monopoly profits may be absorbed internally. 35 
5. In industries with monopoly power, the desire to maximize 
36 profits may be lessened. 
6. Another objection is that PM will be positively associated 
with advertising. This can be shown by an extension of the Dorfman-
Steiner mode1. 37 Given that a firm's demand function is 
0 Q = q ( a ,= A , P) ( 1) 
and its cost function is 
C = c(Q) (2) 
where: P = price 
Q quantity 
A advertising expenditure for firm 
A0 = advertising expenditures of all other firms in the industry. 
The total profit of the firm is 
TT = FQ - C - A. 
Substituting (1) and (2) into (3) gives 
Tf= P (A, A0 , P)- c q(a, A0 , P)- A. q 
(3) 
Taking the first derivative of profits with respect to advertising of 
the firm and setting equal to zero gives 
(P-MC) .Q. +~ 
A A0 
• Ao 
A 
- 1 = o. 
Rearranging and multiplying through by A/A, A0 /A0 , Q/Q, and P/P 
generates 
A 
Q(p - MC) 
PA 
FQ 
(.Q. 
A 
+ 
20 
Rearranging once more gives 
0 L= P- MC ( 9.. :i+!\,. L 
PQ P A Q A Q 
which can be rewritten as 
A = P - MC 
PQ p ~ 4Ao ~ ( A + · conj), (~) 
where: ~A = elasticity of Q with respect to A 
't.A_o"" elasticity of Q with respect to Ao 
2: 
conj conjectural elasticity of A 0 with respect to A 
MC = marginal cost of production. 
Thus, industries with different PM will have different advertising-
1 t . 38 sa es ra 1os. Any least squares estimate of PM (or other measures of 
profitability) will lead to misleading estimates since any exogenous 
change that raises PM will, at the same time, increase the optimal 
level of advertising. Hence, it is difficult to accept the hypothesis 
that advertising barriers "cause" high profits on the basis of simple 
correlations and single-equation regressions. Schmalensee summarizes 
his view of advertising and profits with a criticism of Comanor and 
Wilson: 
Their (Comanor-Wilson) cross-section regressions account 
for only half of the variation in profit rates among 
industries, and without advertising the other variables 
would almost certainly explain less than ~0% of the 
variance. There is nothing in their paper to refute 
the interpretation that industries which have high profits 
for reasons not captured by the other independent variables 
have thereby high optimal and observed advertising/sales 
ratios •••• Since a reasonable model of advertising 
spending indicates profitability is associated with 
advertising intensity even when advertising has no impact 
on monopoly p3~er, the traditional interpretation must 
be abandoned. 
The conclusion is that any study of the impact of advertising on indus-
try structure should be undertaken within a simultaneous equation 
framework. Despite these limitations, the price-cost margin has 
received broad acceptance as a proxy for economic performance at the 
four-digit industry level. Thus, the price-cost margin will be used 
as the dependent variable in this study. 
Calculation of Price-Cost Margin 
The PM is defined as the percentage gross return (before taxes) 
on sales for an industry, or 
where FM 
VA 
LAB 
RENT 
vs 
PM = VA - LAB - RENT 
vs 
price-c?st margin 
value added 
cost of labor 
rental payments 
value of shipments 
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Value added (VA) is obtained by subtracting the total cost of materials 
from the value of shipments and other receipts and adjusting the result 
by the net change in finished products and work-in-progress inventories 
4:o between the beginning and end of year. 
Total labor costs (LAB) include (1) direct payroll payments to 
labor resources, (2) employer contributions to Federal old age and 
survivors insurance, (J) unemployment and workmen's compensation, and 
(4:) employers payments for voluntary programs (e.g., insurance 
4:1 premiums, pension plans, and deferred profit sharing plans). 
Rental payment (RENT) figures include all items for which de-
preciation reserves would be maintained if they were owned by the 
establishment (e.g., structures and buildings, production, office and 
transportation equipment). Excluded from this definition are royalties 
assets. 42 and other payments for the use of intangible and depletable 
22 
Finally, value of shipments (VS) are reported for most industries 
as the net selling values, f.o.b. plant, after discounts and allowances 
and excluding freight charges and excise taxes. Multiunit companies 
report interplant transfers at their full economic value; the plant 
receiving the transferred goods would include them in its costs of 
t . 43 rna er1als. One problem with u. S. data arises in the case of goods 
transferred to branches or sold through separate sales offices. The 
implication of the "f.o.b. plant" instruction is that the value of the 
goods would be slightly lower than the final invoice value, because the 
cost of selling the goods is excluded. There is some evidence that 
these instructions were not faithfully carried out by reporting 
companies. Specifically it appears that the VS reported by multiunit 
companies tends to be overstated. Separate figures are available for 
products for which there are large amounts of interplant shipments. 
D f . . 'bl 44 ata o these sh1pments w1ll be used where poss1 e. Using this 
"Adjusted" data for VS the following formula would be used for the 
price-cost margin: 
PM d. a J 
VA - PAY - RENT 
vs d' a J 
where PM d. 
a J 
price cost margin using the adjusted VS data, and 
45 VS d' =adjusted VS data. 
a J 
The Final Form of the Model 
The form of the basic regression equation to be tested is as 
follows: 
where 
PM = 
CR = 
D = 
B = 
GM = 
I = 
PM = b 
0 
Price-cost margin (unadjusted or adjusted), 
Four-firm seller concentration ratio, 
Rate of growth in industry demand, 
Barriers to entry (product differentiation 
plant size), 
Extent of the geographic market, 
Degree of import competition, 
or economies of 
K = Capital intensity (capital to output ratio or total assets 
to output ratio), and 
e = Disturbance term. 
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The linear form of the model suggests that a one unit change in 
the level of each of the independent variables will have the same 
absolute impact on the price-cost margin. Other statistical forms of 
the regression model employing double-log and semi-log specifications 
were also examined. Preliminary investigation of these alternative 
forms indicated that the linear specification results in a better fit. 
On this basis, the linear form is preferred. 
Summary 
This chapter has discussed the independent variables to be 
examined in this study. The theoretical relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variable has been presented. 
Two definitions of the price-cost margin have been developed for use 
as the dependent variable. Despite some shortcomings, it is argued 
that the price-cost margin is a satisfactory measure of economic 
performance. A final section summarizes the form of the regression 
model used in this study. 
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CHAPI'ER III 
EMPIRICAL TEST OF STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE MODEL 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present empirical evidence 
regarding the major hypotheses stated in Chapter II. The empirical 
results are a product of multiple regression analysis using 1967 data. 
The focus is on four two-digit manufacturing groups which comprise 115 
four-digit industries. The study relies on the industry definitions 
provided by the Bureau of the Census in its Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) data. The two-digit manufacturing groups in-
cluded in the study are: Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20), Chemicals 
and Allied Products (SIC 28), Electrical Machinery Group (SIC 36), 
and Transportation Equipment (SIC 37). These 115 industries accounted 
for over ~0 per cent of the economy's 1967 value-added. The Food and 
Kindred Products group has been at the center of attention in numerous 
ear.lier studies regarding structure and performance. 1 The other three 
groups, Chemicals and Allied Products, Electrical Machinery, and 
Transportation Equipment, are examined because they have been cited 
as part of the Industrial Reorganization Act. 2 This act, also known 
as the Hart Bill, would revise current antitrust laws by establishing 
an Industrial Reorganization Commission with jurisdiction over these 
industries. Thus, these particular two-digit groups are selected 
because of their size relative to the rest of the manufacturing sector 
30 
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and because of the previous interest shown in them by policymakers. 
Analysis of these industries is presented in two sections. First, 
the structure-performance hypothesis is examined within the respective 
two-digit SIC groups. For example, the 41 industries making up SIC 20 
are analyzed independently of the other 74 industries; similarly, the 
27 industries in SIC 28 are reported on separately from industries in 
other two-digit classifications and so forth. The rationale for this 
procedure is that each two-digit group differs in terms of age, size, 
pattern of technology, and market history. To control for some of 
these sources of diversity, the four-digit industries are collected 
into their respective two-digit groups for purposes of cross-sectional 
analysis. Collins and Preston present a defense of such a grouping: 
The characteristics least easy to observe accurately 
and express quantitatively are those associated with the 
unique history and development of each major segment of 
industry. The age, record of technological change, level 
and pattern of change in demand, and interindustry position 
of each group of economic units we identify as an "industry" 
are, in part, unique and not comparable among industries 
even in an ordinal fashion. However, these elusive but 
important features of industry structure, often difficult 
to describe in general terms, are apt to be more similar 
among industries closely related in terms of products, 
technology, or specific sources of demand than among 
industries selected at random from the entire industry 
population.3 
While some of the characteristics ~entioned by Collins and Preston, 
! 
I 
such as change in demand, are explicitly treated as structural 
variables; their approach is used in the first part of this chapter. 
In a second section, all 115 industries are combined to test the 
structure-performance relationship. 
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Estimation of the Models by Two-Digit Groups 
Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20) 
Food and Kindred Products group (SIC 20) contains 41 four-digit 
industries. Two adjustments in the data were made. One industry, 
Manufactured Ice (SIC 2097), was excluded because of data deletions 
in the census report. Second, the four-digit classes Raw Cane Sugar 
(SIC 2061), Cane Sugar Refining (SIC 2062), and Beet Sugar (SIC 2063), 
were combined into a single industry by using a weighted average of 
the concentration ratios (by value of shipments) and a summation 
of other relevant data. One reason for combining these into one 
industry is that the census definitions for four-digit industries are 
based on technological factors; that is, industry groupings are based 
mainly on similarity of process and/or raw materials involved. In 
this case, it is widely agreed that the three-digit classification for 
4 
sugar (SIC 206) is a more appropriate indicator of the sugar industry. 
Seller Concentration. Tables I and II summarize the multiple 
regression results for the two alternative dependent variables, price-
cost margin (PM) and adjusted price-cost margin (PM .), respectively. 
adJ 
It can be seen in all regression models, for either dependent variable, 
that seller concentration is a significant variable in explaining 
industry price-cost margins. In all models, regression coefficients 
for CR display the expected positive sign. The size of the regression 
coefficient is around 0.2 (the range is from 0.167 to 0.318), implying 
that a 1.0 per cent increase in CR results in an increase of about 
0.2 per cent in the price-cost margin. 
Model CR KO 
1 0.201c 
(1.63) 
2 0.167b 
(1.85) 
3 0.200a 
(2.81) 
O.l84a 
(3.47) 
5 0.318a 0.235b 
(4.ll) (2.22) 
TABlE I 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 20, 1967 PRICE-COST 
MARGIN AS DEIENDENT VARIABlE 
TAO MES2 PRD I D GM 
o.ll6a 0.517 -0.139 0.175b 0.002 
(3.23) (0.97) (0.87) (1.83) (0.52) 
0.123a o.696b -3.58lc O.l42b 
(3.69) (1. 75) ( 1. 39) (1.71) 
0.123a 1.585a -0.094 O.ll4 b -0.002 
(4.10) (3.39) (o. 71) (1.4) (0.70) 
0.121a 1.810a -0.124 0.063 
(4.53) (4.95) (o.o6) (0.92) 
0.200 -1.849 0.200b 
(0.22) (o. 65) (2.05) 
Intercept 
3.080 
4.151 
0.607 
0.645 
-1.288 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N=30 for models 1 and 3, N=41 for models 2, 4 and 5 
~Statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 -2 R 
0.63 0.55 
o.6oa 0.55 
0.74a 0.69 
0.74 a 0.71 
o.48a 0.43 
Model CR KO 
1 0.255b 
(2.12) 
2 0.191b 
(2.15) 
3 0.233a 
(3.62) 
0.207a 
(4.35) 
5 0.273a 0.216b 
(2.72) (2.12) 
TABlE II 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 20, 1967 ADJUSTED 
PRICE-COST MARGIN AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
TAO MES2 FRD I D GM 
O.l3la 0.453 -0.129 O.l54c -0.001 
(3. 74) (0.87) (0.83) ( 1.65) (0.36) 
O.l4la 0.759b -4.547b O.l38c 
(4.30) (1.95) (1.80) ( 1.69) 
O.l37a l. 722a -0.076 0.088 -0.001 
(5.06) (4.05) (0.63) (1.19) (0.63) 
O.l38a 2.002a 
-0.737 0.051 
(5.76) (6.09) (0.39) (0.82) 
b 
0.542 0.013 0.201 
(1.19) (0.09) ( l. 97) 
Intercept 
1.589 
3.390 
-0.681 
-0.458 
-2.046 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N=30 for models 1 and 3, N=41 for models 2, 4 and 5 
aStatistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
bStatistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 -2 R 
0.69 a 0.62 
o.66a o.6J 
o.8la 0.77 
o.82a o.8o 
0.54 a 0.48 
These results are consistent with the findings of Collins and 
Preston in their study using 1958 data. Looking at 32 four-digit 
industries, within the Food and Kindred Products group (SIC 20), they 
found that: 
The analysis of data for this group of industries strongly 
supports the hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
price-cost margins and concentrations. The regression 
coefficients of the concentration variable • • • are 
positign and statistically significant at the one per cent 
level. 
The specific regression relationship reported by Collins and Preston 
for 1958 was (t-ratio in parentheses): 
PM = 2.04 + .41CR 
(4.49) 
with an R2 of .40. The same simple linear model was also examined 
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for 41 industries using 1967 data; the relationship found was (t-ratio 
in parentheses): 
with an R2 of .37 and 
PM = 8.36 + 0.33CR 
(4.75) 
PM d" a J 
7.36 + 0.38CR 
(5.22) 
with an R2 of .41 significant at the one per cent level. 
Capital Intensity. For models 2 and 5 (for both dependent 
variables), two alternative measures of capital intensity are employed. 
In model 5 the ratio of gross book value of depreciable assets to value 
of shipments (KO) is used as the capital intensity ind~pendent variable. 
6 This is the same measure sugg~sted by Collins and Preston, and adopted 
by several authors. 7 This is a crude measure of capital intensity 
because it reflects the acquisition cost of assets, but is defensible 
in that it does reflect inter-industry difference~ in asset holdings. 
' 
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The results are that the KO variable is significant at the five per 
cent level; this means the hypothesis that the regression coefficient 
is zero cannot be accepted. This finding is similar to that of Collins 
8 
and Preston. 
Another measure of capital intensity is the ratio of total assets 
to industry value of shipments (TAO). Total asset figures were those 
reported in the balance sheet of the corporation's books of account as 
of December 31, 1967. 9 For SIC 20, TAO values are 1.7 times larger 
than KO; in specific industries, the range of values is from 1.03 times 
in SIC 2096 to over eight times as large in SIC 2085 (see Appendix B). 
The two measures are related with a simple correlation coefficient of 
0.52 which is significant at the 0.1 per cent level. The results for 
models one through four show that the independent variable TAO is 
significantly different from zero at the 1.0 per cent level. The value 
of the coefficient implies that a 1.0 per cent increase in TAO 
results in an increase of about 0.12 per cent in PM or 0.13 per cent 
in PM d .• 
a J 
A comparison of model 2 with model 5 provides a test of which of 
the two measures of capital intensity is superior. The two models 
are identical except for the measure of capital intensity used. For 
either dependent variable, TAO gives better explanatory power as 
measured by R- 2 and the · ff' · t b tl ~· regress1on coe 1c1en s are more ro us y 
10 
significant than KO. The conclusion is that TAO is a better proxy 
for capital intensity than KO. 
Minimum Efficient Plant Size. There are mixed findings on the 
role of barriers to entry in permitting high price-cost margins. 
Models 1, 2, and 5 investigate the effect of barriers as measured by 
37 
the minimum efficient size plant (MES). The variable reported is 
obtained by taking the plants in the largest census employment-size 
category, and expressing the output of the "average" plant as a fraction 
11 
of industry output. Although a positive sign was found in all cases, 
as expected, only in model 2 is the regression coefficient for MES 
significantly different from zero. Lack of significance for MES in 
explaining PM has also been reported by Ime1 12 in a study of the United 
States food processing industry and Comanor and Wilson13 in their study 
of 41 consumer goods industries. 
Three explanations may be used to explain this result. First, it 
is possible that there are entry barriers but that MES does not properly 
reflect these barriers. While no evidence is available which unam-
biguously rejects this contention, it is possible to compare theMES 
estimates used in this study to oth~r available estimates of scale 
., 
economies. A study by Esposito, Noel and Esposito provides such a 
comparison. 14 Using 1963 data, estimates for scale economies were 
reported for 147 manufacturing industries. Of these industries~ 19 
were directly comparable to ones in SIC 20. The product-moment cor-
relation between these two data sets is 0.78 which is significant at 
the 1.0 per cent level. This indicates that MES estimates used in 
this study are highly related to estimates of scale economies used 
elsewhere and can be considered equally as good (or bad). 
A second explanation assumes there are entry barriers and that 
MES is an appropriate barrier prexy, but that presence of a high degree 
of inter-correlation between MES and CR makes it impossible to dis-
t t . . f f t t . b l5 entangle he rela 1ve 1n luences o he wo var1a les. The simple 
correlation coefficient between MES and CR is 0.73. 
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A final view suggests that MES is a poor proxy for entry barriers 
and, therefore, a large MES is not a barrier to entry for new or 
potential firms. Stigler argues that an entry barrier is a cost of 
producing that faces a firm which seeks to enter the industry, but is 
t f d b . t. f" 16 Q£_ ace y ex1s 1ng 1rms. Since MES is viewed by both existing 
and potential firms, it is not a barrier to entry. 
Product Differentiation. Models 3 and 4 test the hypothesis that 
barriers to entry, as measured by advertising intensity, are positively 
related to price-cost margins. Advertising intensity will be defined 
as the ratio of total advertising expenditures to total sales for the 
various four-digit industry groups. The results strongly support the 
stated hypothesis. The regression coefficients are significant at the 
-2 1.0 per cent level for both dependent variables with R between 0.69 
and o.8o. 
The findings about product differentiation is SIC 20 are con-
. 17 18 
sistent with those reported by Comanor and W1lson, Shepherd, and 
Ime1. 19 In model 4, the value of the regression coefficient is about 
two (1.8 for PM and 2.0 for PM d.). The standard interpretation of 
a J 
this would be that a one unit increase in advertising intensity will 
raise price-cost margins about two percentage points. 
An alternative way to view the coefficient of advertising 
intensity involves calculating the elasticity of the price-cost margin 
with respect to advertising intensity and is defined as 
L:PM,PRD q(PM) 
PM 
PRD 
(l(PRD) 
.20 
This elasticity can be approximated by using the regression coefficient 
of advertising intensity in model 4 as a proxy for (lPM/oPRD and the 
respective means of advertising intensity and price-cost margins as 
estimates of IRD and PM. Elasticities for PM and PM d" in SIC 20 are 
a J 
2 d 31 t . 1 21 0. 9 an 0. respec 1ve y. These elasticities suggest that a 1.0 
per cent increase in advertising intensity is associated with a 0.3 
per cent increase in the price-cost margin. 
In order to interpret the relationship between advertising in-
tensity and price-cost margins, it must be recognized that advertising 
expenditures are included in PM. Thus, P.RD will affect price-cost 
margins even if it does not serve as a barrier to entry. McFetridge 
39 
has reported that approximately 90 per cent of all Canadian advertising 
services are purchased externally to the firm. 22 The conclusion that 
advertising acts as a barrier is warranted only if advertising ex-
penditures increase PM by an amount greater than the external portion 
of the expenditure. Hence, the value of the regression coefficient 
must be greater than 0.9 if IRD acts as a barrier. The t-values for 
model 4 were 
t = 0.9 - 1.810 =-2.49 and 
.366 
t 0.9 - 2.002 
.329 
-3.35 
with both significant at the 1.0 per cent level. The conclusion is 
that advertising does act as a barrier to entry. 
Import Competition. The impact of foreign competition on price-
cost margins is examined by utilizing a dummy variable. 23 The dummy 
variable assumes a value of one when imports comprise more than one 
per cent of total sales and a value of zero otherwise. In all models, 
the sign of the regression coefficient is negative, indicating that the 
greater the degree of foreign competition the lower will be price-cost 
margins. However, in only one model (model 2) does the expected 
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negative sign differ significantly from zero. The results provide 
limited support for the view that where imports comprise a substantial 
share of total sales, established firms will maintain lower price-cost 
margins. 24 The presence of foreign firms (and the threat of potential 
foreign entry) have only a marginal influence on industry performance. 
Change in Demand and Geographic Market. The effect of a change 
in industry demand on price-cost margins indicates that in most cases 
(? out of 10) the regression coefficient of the independent variable D, 
is significantly different from zero and possesses the hypothesized 
sign. The final independent variable tested is the size of the 
geographic market (GM). Results are shown in models l and 3 (note that 
because of imcomplete data only thirty observations were available for 
SIC 20). The results are that GM does not exhibit significant ex-
planatory power about price-cost margins. This differs from findings 
of other authors. 25 Lack of significance for this variable suggests 
that (l) the size of geographic markets has no impact on industry 
performance (i.e., concentration ratios are adequate indicators of the 
market power), or (2) the GM measure developed by Weiss does not 
properly reflect the regional nature of some industries. 
Summary. The findings for SIC 20 provide strong support for the 
expected relationship between seller concentration and price-cost 
margins. The strength of this findings weakens as other aspects of 
industry structure are introduced into the regression equations. 
Capital intensity and product differentiation are also found to be 
important independent variables in explaining price-cost margins. 
Other structural variables such as minimum efficient plant size, import 
competition, and change in demand are found to be only marginally 
~1 
important in the regression models. 
Chemicals and Allied Products (SIC 28) 
The Chemicals and Allied Products group covers 27 four-digit 
industries. As a group these industries generated over $42 billion 
worth of sales and almost $26 billion worth of valued-added in 1967. 
A change in the measurement of product differentiation (PRD) was made 
for this set of industries. A consumer-producer dummy variable is 
used as a proxy for PRD, where producer goods industries are classified 
zero and consumer.goods industries with a one to indicate the presence 
of PRD. 26 This change was made necessary because advertising expendi-
tures were not available by four-digit classes. 
Seller Concentration. Tables III and IV summarize the regression 
results in SIC 28 for the alternative dependent variables, PM and 
PM d"" The results lend only modest support to the hypothesis that 
a J 
seller concentration and price cost margins are positively related. 
In only half the models is the CR variable significantly different 
from zero. This is very similar to results reported by Collins and 
Preston for 19 industries within the Chemicals and Allied Products 
group. The results of their regression analysis were 
PM = 32.12 - 0.09 CR 
(o. 69) 
with an R2 equal to 0.03. This same simple linear model for 27 
industries in 1967 is 
with an R2 of 0.01 and 
PM - 31.07 + 0.06 CR 
(0.57) 
PM . 
adJ 28.61 + 0.15 CR. ( 1. 27) 
Model CR KO 
1 0.297c 
(1.58) 
2 0.198 
(1.25) 
3 -o.o86 
(0.87) 
o.o66 
(0.57) 
5 0.209 0.022 
(l.JO) (o. 35) 
6 o.196c 
(1.35) 
TABlE III 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 28~ 1967 FRICE-COST 
MARGIN AS DEFENDENT VARIABlE 
TAO MES3 FRD I D GM 
-0.017 -2.019c -L678 0.006 24c.24c 
(0.25) ( 1.89) (0.31) (0.26) (0.50) 
0.024c -1.388 -6.350c 0.027 
(0.57) ( 1.4co) ( 1. """") (0.28) 
O.ll2b 27.972a 7.222c 
-0.034c -0.001 
(2.18) (4c.88) (0.4c9) (0.12) 
0.019 11.4c96b -2.677 -0.095 
(o.4c8) (2.27) (0.59) (1.15) 
-1.380 
-7.197 o.o3J 
(1.38) (1.59) (O.J3) 
0.018 -1.226 10.954c -2.098 -0.037 
(0.4c5) ( l. 34c) (2.20) (0.4c7) (o.4co) 
Intercept 
0.28 
)0.31 
21.15 
31.11 
30.97 
27.28 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N=20 for models 1 and 3, N= 27 for models 2, 4c, 5, and 6 
:statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 -2 R 
0.03 0.03 
0.24cc 0.10 
0.66 b 0.54c 
o.J3 b 0.21 
0.23 0.09 
b 0.24c 0.39 
Model CR KO 
1 o.424b 
(2.41) 
2 0.347c 
(1.86) 
3 0.088 
( 1.02) 
0.213c 
(1.50) 
5 0.301c 0.017 
(1.58) (0.23) 
6 0.347b 
(1.83) 
TAO 
0.007 
(0.11) 
TABlE IV 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 28, 1967 ADJUSTED 
PRICE-COST MARGIN AS DEPENDENT VARIABlE 
MES3 IRD I D GM 
-1.697 -2.558 0.204b 0.002 
(1.69) (0.51) (2.08) (0.19) 
-0.020 -1.322 -6.346 0.120 
(0.40) ( 1.14) (1.22) (1.07) 
0.126a 26.506a 6.197 0.153b -o.oo4 
(2.85) (5.14) (1.65) (0.58) (0.58) 
-0.21 4.628 
-5.362 0.036 
(0.41) (0.72) (0.92) (o. 35) 
-1.28 -6.255 0.131 
(1.09) (1.19) ( 1.12) 
-0.023 -1.261 4.071 -4.766 0.096 
(o.44) (1.07) (o.63) (0.82) (0.81) 
t-ratio shown 1n parentheses N=20 for models 1 and 3, N=27 for models 2, 
:statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Intercept R2 -2 R 
13.92 o.43 0.23 
25.74 0.19 0.05 
10.10 0.77a 0.69 
28.55 0.17 0.01 
24.16 0.19 0.04 
25.41 0.21 0.02 
4, 5 and 6 
~ 
w 
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The results for this group are strongly affected by the presence 
of three high margin and relatively low concentration industries; 
these industries are: 
1. SIC 2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations (PM= 59, CR 24) 
2. SIC 2844 Toilet Preparations (PM = 57, CR = 38) 
3. SIC 2842 Polishes and Sanitation Gaods (PM:::: 46, CR = 35). 
One factor common to this "high margin, low concentration" group 
is that all three are consumer gaods industries in a sample composed 
primarily of producer goods industries (20 of the 27 industries in 
SIC 28 are classified as producer goods industries). 27 To test the 
possible impact of this, the regressian models were recomputed with 
all seven consumer goods industries excluded. The results are pre-
sented in Table V. In general the structural variables do a better 
job in explaining variation in the price-cost margins. The multiple 
correlation coefficient between CR, TAO, and MES is 0.76 and between 
CR, KO, and MES it is 0.71. This is evidence of multicollinearity 
between these variables making it impossible to attribute exact 
meacning to the individual coefficients. 
Capital Intensity. Examining models 2 and 5 (for both dependent 
variables) indicates that neither measure of capital intensity, KO 
or TAO, is significant in explaining variation in the price-cost 
margins. 2 Also a comparison of R suggests that there is little 
difference between the two variables. 28 
TABlE V 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 28, 1967 PRODUCER GOODS SUBCLASS 
Dependent 
Variable CR KO TAO ffiS3 I D Intercept 
PM 0.110 0.10 b -ls008 5.983b 0.012 l4o.90 
(6.74o) (2.14o) (1.33) (1.56) (0.19) 
PM 0.162 0.109b -1.162 2.4o6o 0.026 l6.4o8 
(1.17) (2.14o) ( 1.55) (0.67) (0.38) 
PM -0.042 OQ123a 5.875c -0.015 17.10 
(0.4o3) ( 3.ol) (l.4o9) (0.24o) 
PM d. 0.139 0.117a -0.637 7-32lb 0.177a 6.79 a J (0.97) (2~81) (0.87) ( 1.99) (2.84o) 
PM . 
adJ 0.233C 0.109b -0.919 3.265 O.l86a 9.12 
(1.63) (2.07) ( 1.18) (0.86) (2.66) 
PM . o.o4o3 O.l32b 7-253b 0.160a 7-38 
adJ (0.4o7) (3.4o8) ( 1.99) (2.7J) 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N = 20 
~Statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 
0.56 b 
0.54o b 
0.50 b 
0.68 
0.62 b 
o.66a 
-2 R 
o.4o4o 
o.4o2 
o.4ol 
0.60 
0.52 
0.60 
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Minimum Efficient Plant Size. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 examine the 
relationship between barriers to entry and price-cost margins. The 
minimum efficient size plant (MES) is used as a proxy for barriers to 
entry. The measure of MES used is defined as the average plant size 
among the largest plants accounting for 50 per cent of the industry 
output. 29 The models show that the coefficient of MES is significantly 
different from zero at the 10 per cent level in five of eight cases 
and negative in all equations. This is contrary to the stated hypo-
thesis.30 
The insignificance of CR and both the capital intensity measures 
while the MES variable is significant has two possible explanations. 
First, a relatively serious problem of multicollinearity is present 
between these three variables. The simple correlation coefficients for 
the three are shown in Appendix C. The range is between 0.47 and 0.65. 
The multiple correlation coefficient between CR, TAO, and MES is 0.53; 
and between CR, KO, and MES it is 0.57. Such a high collinearity 
makes it impossible to attach precise meaning to the estimated value and 
the level of significance of the individual coefficients of CR, TAO, 
KO, and MES. It would be, however, incorrect .to leave out from the 
specification any of these variables for the purpose of improving the 
significance level of the retained variable. 31 A second possible 
explanation is that organizational inefficiences (X - inefficiency) 
increase with plant size. Thus, the expected positive relationship 
between PM and MES is outweighed by the presence of X - inefficiencies. 
Product Differentiation. Models 3, 4, and 6 look at the role of 
product differentiation (P.RD) where P.RD is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the industry is consumer good oriented or producer good 
lt7 
industry. In general, a strong positive relationship is found which 
supports the stated hypothesis. That is, the higher P.RD (consumer goods 
industries) the greater the price-cost margins. 
Import Competition. The effect of foreign competition on price 
cost margins is examined in the models shown in Tables III and IV. A 
dummy variable, taking on a value of one when imports make up more 
than 1.0 per cent of all sales and zero when imports are less than 1.0 
t f 11 1 . t . 1 . d 30 per cen o a sa es, 1s u 1 1ze • The results are generally sup-
portive of the hypothesis that more foreign competition will lower 
price-cost margins. Only in model 3 is the opposite outcome found. 
However, when the producer goods industry subclass is tested in Table V, 
the sign of I changes to positive and it is significant in four of six 
cases. This positive sign means that price cost margins and degree of 
import competition move in the same direction. These results are in 
opposition to the conclusion of Esposito and Esposito, although they 
did report that the degree of import competition was different between 
32 producer and consumer good groups. Each in his 1963 study also notes 
that import competition varies between consumer and producer groups, 
but in an opposite way to findings reported here. 33 
One explanation for this positive relationship is that relatively 
high imports are a result of increasing total demand. For example, 
if there is a disequilibrium situation in which incomes are rising, 
I 
the demand for imports will also be likely to rise. Empirically, 
this would show up as price-cost margins and import intensity being 
positively related. Another possibility is that if many imports are 
made up of component parts used as inputs for final processing in the 
United States, then high imports would be consistent with higher 
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. t . 34 pr1ce-cos marg1ns. 
Rate of Growth in Demand and Geographic Market. Evidence on the 
final two independent variables, change in sales (D) and geographic 
market ·(GM), suggests that they are not very important in explaining 
price-cost margins. However, for the 20 producer goods industries, 
Table V shows that the regression coefficients for D are significantly 
different from zero using adjusted price cost margin as the dependent 
variable. The size of the coefficients suggests that a 1.0 per cent 
growth in sales will raise price-cost margins about 0.2 points. 
Summary. The structural model developed in Chapter II does not 
prove to be a good predictor of industry price-cost margins for SIC 28. 
Specifically, seller concentration is not an important predictor of 
economic performance (as measured by price-cost margins). As noted, 
this result is similar to the finding of Collins and Preston. 
Electrical Machinery Group (SIC 36) 
Electrical Machinery Group (SIC 36) is made up of 33 four-digit 
industries. These 33 industries had total sales of over $43 billion 
and value-added of almost $25 billion in 1967. This makes SIC 36 the 
fourth largest two-digit group within the manufacturing sector and it 
accounts for nearly 10 per cent of value-added in manufacturing. As 
in SIC 28j product differentiation (P.RD) is entered into the analysis 
as a dummy variable representing consumer good industries. 
Seller Concentration. Tables VI an,d VII summarise the findings 
related to SIC 36 for both PM and PM d'" In all models examined 
a J 
seller concentration (CR is directly related to price-cost margins 
(however measured). This supports the stated hypothesis. 
Model CR KO 
l O.l84b 
(2.06) 
2 0.108b 
( 1.85) 
3 0.214a 
(3.11) 
O.l47a 
(2.81) 
5 O.ll2b -0.025 
( l. 77) (0.29) 
TABlE VI 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 36 9 1967 PRICE-COST 
MARGIN AS DEPENDENT VARIABlE 
TAO MES2 PRD I D 
i 
-0.029 -0.157 1.961.! 0.044 
( 1.09) (0.43) (0.55) (0.81) 
-0.012 0.350 1.263 0.025 
(0.55) ( 1.16) (0.42) (0.87) 
-0.025 -3.874 1.431 0.020 
( 1.00) (1.42) (0.43) (0.37) 
-0.007 -1.499 0.321 0.021 
(0.32) (0.60) (O.ll) (o.68) 
0.325 0.852 0.023 
( 1.08) (0.29) (0.78) 
GM Intercept 
0.002 11.28 
(0~79) 
15.87 
0.003 12.94 
(0.95) 
17.31 . 
16.09 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N=27 for models l and 3, N=33 for models 2, 4 and 5 
:statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 -2 R 
0.30 0.14 
0.28c 0.19 
0.]6 0.21 
0.27 0.16 
0.29c 0.19 
TABlE VII 
RE~RESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 36, 1967 ADJUSTED PRICE-COST 
. MARGIN AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Model CR KO TAO MES2 PRD I D GM 
1 0.25~b -0.0~2 0.29~ 1.671 0.067 o.oo~ 
(2.67) ( 1.52) (0.71) (0.~5) ( 1.16) (0.98) 
2 0.1~1 b -0.026 o.655b 1.858 0.030 
(2.23) (1.07) (2.01) (0.57) (0.9~) 
3 0.318a -0.0~3 -}. 735 1.021 0.0~3 o.oo6c 
(~.25) (1.61) ( l. 26) (0.28) (0. 72) ( 1.65) 
0.206a 
-0.018 -0.~68 o.~J5 0.030 
(3.~J) (0.7~) (0.17): (0.13) (0.85) 
5 O.l58b -0.080 0.595c 0.990 0.02~ 
(2.30) {0.87) (1. 82) (0.31) (0.75) 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N=27 for models 1 'and 3, N=33 for models 2, ~ and 5 
:statistically significant at the one per.cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Intercept R2 
7-15 0.~6 b 
lJ.65 o.~Ja 
7.02 0.~9 b 
15.73 0.35 b 
1~.62 o.~2a 
-2 R 
O.J~ 
0.35 
0.37 
0.25 
0.3~ 
Vl 
0 
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The size of the regression coefficient is around 0.2 (the range for 
models 1 and 3 is from 0.18 to 0.32 and the range for models 2, 4, and 
5~ is from 0.11 to 0.21). The standard interpretation is that a 1.0 
per cent increase in CR results in price-cost margins rising by 0.2 
per cent. 
Also tested was the model PM a + BCR where 
PM = price-cost margin 
CR = four firm seller concentration. 
The result is (t-ratio in parentheses): 
PM 17.93 + 0.14 CR 
(3.08) 
with R2 equal to 0.23, significant at the 1.0 per cent level. The 
model for the adjusted price-cost margin yields somewhat stronger 
results; they are 
PM. a~ = 16.35 + 0.20 CR (3.77) 
2 
and an R of 0.31 (also significant at the 1.0 per cent level). The 
findings reported by Collins and Preston differ from the above in that 
the CR variable was not found to be significant. Their regression 
analysis was 
PM 16.36 + 0.11 CR 
(1.46) 
with an R2 of only 0.12. 35 One possible reason for this difference 
is that the Collins and Preston study combined several of the four-
digit industries together. For exa~ple, observations on SIC 3613 
and 3622 (switchgear-switchboards and industrial controls were 
averaged together. Also all industries in the 366 and 367 were not 
included in their study. No explanation of these data adjustments is 
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is offered by Collins and Preston, but it is apparently due to extensive 
census data revision in 1957. 36 
Capital Intensity. Models 2 and 5 compare the two measures of 
capital intensity, KO and TAO. None of the regression coefficients 
for either measure of capital intensity is significant in explaining 
variations in price-cost margins. However, the signs of the coefficients 
were negative which is opposite the~ prioi expectation. A similar 
outcome is found in Collins and Preston. 37 
Minimum Efficient Plant Size. Models 1, 2 and 5 look at the 
effect of barriers to entry on price-cost margins. As was the case for 
SIC 20 and 28, three different estimates of minimum efficient size 
plant (MES) are tested, but only the best is reported. The MES that gave 
the best results is the same as the one used for SIC 20. The variable 
is equal to the output of the "average" size plant expressed as a 
per cent of industry output. The "average" size plant is calculated 
by means of the plants in the largest census employment-size category. 
For dependent variable IN, the regression coefficient for MES was not 
significantly different from zero (and in one case, Model 1, possessed 
a negative sign). 
However, using dependent variable PM d' as the performance 
a J 
variable, the regression coefficient is significantly different from 
zero in two of these models. The exception is for model 1 which is 
due to missing data for another variable, GM, is limited to only 27 
observations. Ths size of the regression coefficients imply that a 
1.0 per cent increase in MES will raise PM d' by about 0.6 per cent. 
a J 
Presence of multicollinearity is not as sever for SIC 36 as with the 
previous two groups. The simple correlation coefficient between MES 
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and CR is 0.~9 and the multiple correlation coefficient between CR, 
TAO, and MES is 0.26. 
Product Differentiation, Growth in Demand,.and Geographic Market. 
Product differentiation (PRD) is looked at in models 3 and ~. The 
results provide po support for the hypothesis that PRD and price-cost 
margins are positively related since in both models the regression 
coefficient is negative. The effect of foreign competition (I) and 
change in demand (D) is viewed in models 1 through 5. As with PRD, 
there is no evidence to support the ~ prioi view regarding the role of 
these variables. Finally, geographic market (GM) is found to have a 
significant effect on the dependent variable in model 3 (for PM d') 
a J 
but in an opposite fashion to that hypothesized. 
Summary. The hypothesized relationship between seller concen-
tration and price-cost margins is supported by the data for SIC J6. 
In the simple model about one-fourth of the variation in price-cost 
margins is explained by seller concentration. The strength of this 
relationship weakens as additional structural variables are added to 
the model. None of the other- str4ctural variables, except the proxies 
for barriers to entry in models 2 and 5 for adjusted price-cost margin, 
were significant predictors of price-cost margins. 
Transportation Eguipment Group (SIC 37) 
The Transportation Equipment Group (SIC 37) covers only 1~ four-
digit industries. These industries accounted for over $68 billion 
worth of sales and over $28 billion of value-added in 1967. This 
meant that SIC 37 produced over 10 per cent of sales and value-added 
in manufacturing in 1967. The dominate industry within this group is 
Motor Vehicles (SIC 3711). It accounts for over 25 per cent of this 
group's value-added and almast two-fifths of its total sales. 
The regression results of SIC 37 are presented in Table VIII. 38 
The structure variables, seller concentration (CR), capital intensity 
(KO or TAO), change in demand (D), and product differentiation (PRD), 
are nat found to be significantly related to price-cost margins. The 
effect of barriers to entry (measure by MES 3) is significantly 
different from zero in all models examined. The coefficient averages 
around 0.68 and is relatively stable in all models. The simple cor-
relation coefficient between CR, TAO, and MES is 0.44. This, together 
with the presence of high R2 and few independent variables significant, 
indicates that multicollinearity is present in these regression results. 
The final variable, import competition (I), possesses a positive 
sign in all cases with t-values ranging as high as 2.15. This runs 
counter to the view that degree of import competition will lower 
price-cost margins. 
Estimation of Model for 115 Industries 
This subsection reports results of the model for all 115 four-
digit industries included in the study. These selected industries 
account for over $100 billion dollars of 1967 value-added; or, stated 
another way, these industries made up almost 41 per cent of total 
manufacturing value-added in 1967. 
The five models tests are shown in Tables IX and X. Seller con-
centration and capital intensity are directly related to price-cost 
margins, and are generally statistically significant. Barriers to 
entry, import competition, industry growth, and geographic market carry 
TABlE VIII 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SIC 37 1 1967 
Dependent 
Variable CR KO TAO MES3 PRD .I D 
PM -0.054 -0.008 o.655a 4.787 -0.041 
(O. 87) (0.59) (3.22) (2.15) (0.51) 
PM 0.089 0.012 0.743 3.273 0.045 
( 1. 35) (0.55) (0.20) (0.92) (0. 36) 
PM 
-0.039 0.000 o.6o8a 4.620 -0.029 
(0.65) (0.05) ( 3.15) (2.01) (0.36) 
PM d" -0.001 0.007 0.719a 3.823 -0.013 
a J (0.01) (0.43) (3.04) (1.47) (0.14) 
PM . 0. l57c 0.030 1.300 1.992 0.075 
adJ (2.11) (1.26) (0.31) (0.50) (0.54) 
PM d. o.oo6 · 0.720a 0.009 3.512 -0.009 
a J (0.14) ( 1.04) (3.46) (1.42) (0.10) 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N = 14 
~Statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Intercept R2 
15.41 o.67c 
6.19 0.25 
13.79 o.66c 
11.36 0.72 b 
1.36 0.40 
_10. 79 0.75 
b 
-2 R 
0.53 
-0.08 
0.51 
0.60 
0.14 
0.64 
\Jl 
Vl 
Medel CR KO 
1 0.204c 
(2.85) 
. b 
2 0.118 
(2.25) 
3 0.213a 
(4.03) 
0.15Ja 
(3.63) 
5 0.14la 0.015 
(2.62) ( 1.12) 
TABlE IX 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SELECTED FOUR-DIGIT INDUSTRIES 
PRICE~COST MARGINS DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 1967 
TAO MES2 PRD I D GM 
0.030 0.056 -1.635 0.028 -0.001 
(1.47) (0.16) (0.68) (0.62) (0.22) 
0.056 a 0.261 . -2.577 c -0.004 
·(3.23) ( 1.06) ( 1. 33) (O.lJ) 
0.032c 1.844 -1.165 0.036 -0.001 
( 1.57) (0.82) (0.48) (0.78) (0.27) 
o.o5oa 2.999c 
-1.93 o.oo6 
(3.46) ( 1.56) (0.98) (0.19) 
0.312 -1.996 0.003 
( 1.22) (0.99) (0.07) 
Intercept 
13.63 
15.65 
12.09 
13.07 
17.01 
t-ratie shown in parentheses N = 85 for models 1 and 3, N = 115 for models 2, 4 and 5 
aStatistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
bStatistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 -2 R 
0.22a 0.17 
0.22a 0.19 
0.23 a 0.18 
0.23a 0.20 
0.16a 0.13 
TABlE X 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SElECTED ~OUR~DIGIT INDUSTRIES ADJUSTED 
PRICE~COST MARGIN AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 1967 
Model CR KO TAO MES2 PRD I D GM Intercept 
1 0.310a 0.013 0.088 -1.544 o.o84c -0.001 9.50 
(4.38) (1.02) (0.25) (0.64) ( 1.80) (o.o8) 
2 0.167a 0.051a 0.337 -2.555 0.017 13.69 
(2. 95) (2.76) ( 1.27) (1.22) (0.46) 
a 0.033c -1.:412 o.o86c 3 0.301 1.773 -0.001 7.91 
(5.63) ( 1.60) (0.78) (0.57) (1.87) (0.38) 
0.211 a 0.055a 2.155 -2,.064 0.027 11.69 
(4.61) (2.91) (1.03) (0.96) (0.73) 
5 0.188a O.Ol8c 0.387c -2.124 0.023 14.74 
(3.28) ( 1. 36) (1.43) (0.99) (0.62) 
t-ratio shown in parentheses N = 85 for models 1 and 3, N = 115 for models 2, 4 and 5 
:statistically significant at the one per cent level (one-tailed test) 
Statistically significant at the five per cent level (one-tailed test) 
cStatistically significant at the 10 per cent level (one-tailed test) 
R2 -2 R 
0.34 b 0.30 
0.26 b 0.24 
0.35a 0.31 
0.26a 0.23 
0.22 a 0.20 
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the expected signs 1 but are statistically significant in less than one-
third of the possible cases. 
Rhodes and Cleaver, in their study of 352 four-digit industries, 
reported regression results for price-cost margins as a function of 
seller concentration as: 
PM 17.08 + 0.136 CR 
(7.01) 
with an adjusted R2 of 0.121. 39 The same model was tested for the 115 
four-digit industries and the results are: 
with R2 of 0.1)2 and 
PM = 16.67 + 0.176 CR 
(4c.l4c) 
PM 
adj 15.20 + 0.2)4c CR (5.14c) 
with R2 of 0.189 significant at the 1.0 per cent level. These results 
indicate both dependent variables give support for the structure-
performance hypothesis, but that the adjusted price-cost margin (PM d.) 
a J 
shows a stronger relationship in terms of R2 and the t-values. One 
possible reason for the superiority of PM d" is the presence of an 
a J 
unintended 1 but systematic 1 bias in the reporting of goods transferred 
within branches or sold through separate sales offices. This problem 
is most severe in multiplant companies. The result is that price-cost 
margins (unadjusted) tend to understate the "true" margin. Correction 
for this problem is seen to improve the hypothesized relationship. 
A similar evaluation of the two capital intensity measures, TAO 
and K0 1 can be made by examining models 2 and 5. These models indicate 
2 
that both terms of R and t-values, TAO is the best measure of capital 
industry. 
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The role of industry growth is shown in Tables IX and X to be 
positively, but weakly, related to price-cost margins. In Chapter II, 
an alternative hypothesis suggested that there may be a differential 
effect of growth on price-cost margins in highly concentrated (or 
oligopolistic) industries. In concentrated markets, rapid growth 
of demand will encourage firms to behave highly competitively. The 
firms will attempt to increase their individual market shares in order 
that future profits will be greater. Caves states this view: 
Firms in the fast-growing industry will see hugh profits 
in the offing if they increase their individual shares 
of the market. Even if cutting the price or raising the 
quality of the product sacrifices profits this year, the 
return from having a bigger share of next year 1 s bigger 
market may more than compensate for this year's profit 
recution. Firms in the fast-growing indust40 are likely 
to be highly competitive in their behavior. 
In static, or slow-growth industries, efforts by one firm to increase 
its market share will probably cut total profits for the industry. 
Therefore, firms in the static industry may have less incentive to 
behave competitively. 
In order to test this hypothesis a highly concentrated industry 
was identified as an industry whose four-firm seller concentration 
41 
equaled or exceeded 50 per cent. By this definition, 51 of the four-
digit industries are concentrated. Next, these industries were 
classified as either fast or slow-growth industries based on the change 
in industry sales between 1963 and 1967. Industries that experienced 
growth in sales greater than 30 per cent were designated as fast-growth 
industries; industries where rates of growth were less than 30 per cent 
are assigned a slow-growth classification. Twenty-six concentrated 
industries were fast-growth and 25 were slow-growth. 
60 
The question asked is 1 do price-cost margins in concentrated 
industries vary with rates of growth? Specifically, the null hypothesis 
is 
where PMF equals price-cost margins in fast-growth industries and PMS 
is the price-cost margin in slow-growth industries. The alternative 
hypothesis is 
This hypothesis will also be examined using the adjusted price-cost 
margin. 
The results are given in Table XI. As may be observed, the price-
cost margins for highly concentrated, fast growth industries are not 
significantly different from price-cost margins in highly concentrated, 
slow growth industries. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Since other factors, such as capital intensity and minimum efficient 
size plant, affect price-cost margins a model examining the differential 
impact of growth on PM, holding these other factors constant, was 
tested. The 51 concentration industries results were (t-ratio in 
parentheses) 
PM = 4. 96 + 0.24CR + 0.07TAO + 0.18 MES 2. - O.OJD 
(2.19) (2.88) (0.69) (0.73) 
with an R2 = 0.25. The value of the regression coefficient for D is 
negative, but not significantly different from zero. This simple 
test for these selected industries fails to support the view that 
there is a differential impact of growth or price-cost margin in highly 
concentrated industries. 
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TABlE XI 
COMPARISON OF MEANS IN HIGHLY CONCENTRATED INDUSTRIES 
Mean S.D. 
PMF 28.57a 12.22 
PMS 28.88a 9.06 
PMADF Jl.9Jb 12.78 
PMADS J0.99b 10.52 
at-ratio 0.10 
b . t-rat1o 0.26 
Symbols: 
PMF price-cost margin in fast-growth group 
PMS price-cost margin in slow-growth group 
PMADF: adjusted price-cost margin in fast-growth group 
PMADS: adjusted price-cost margin in slow-growth group 
Finally, a brief look at a variable omitted from this study is in 
order. The impact of buyer concentration on price-cost margins is not 
considered in this study. It is anticipated that increases in buyer 
concentration would result in a reduction in price-cost margins. 
Rec'ently, tl;lis exPected negative relationship between buyer concen-
tratioJ:i and the price-cost margin has received empirical support in 
42 
a study by Lustgarten. In this study, the exclusion of the buyer 
concentration variable was found to have its greatest impact where 
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seller concentration is high. Thus, the introduction of a buyer con-
centration variable would be expected to reinforce, rather than 
eliminate, the relationship between the structural variables and price-
cost.margins observed in this study. 
Summary 
The empirical results of the structure-performance hypothesis have 
'-1 been presented in this ca~ter. The tests were designed to determine 
the relative influence of certain elements of industry structure on 
industry price-cost margins in the year 1967. A positive relationship 
between seller concentration and industry price-cost margins is 
consistently found in SIC 20 and SIC 36. No such support is noted for 
SIC 28 and 37. Other structural variables receive only tentative 
support in the industries investigated. The structural model for all 
115 four-digit industries taken together explains only about one-quarter 
of the variation in price-cost margin. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WELFARE LOSS MODEL 
In traduction 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, a theoretical 
framework for estimating welfare loss due to monopoly is developed. 
Next~ the theoretical model is related to available data indicating 
how the model can be estimated. Finally some of the limitations of the 
model are examined. 
Theoretical Model 
Assume there are two industries in the ~conomy and one is 
competitive and the other is a monopoly. In Figure 5, X is the output 
c 
of the competitive industry, X is the output of the monopoly industry~ 
m 
and RR' is community production possibilities curve. If price were set 
equal to marginal cost (P = MC) in both industries (i.e., budget 
line ppv), point A on indifference curve III would represent society's 
1 
equilibrium position for the two products. With monopoly pricing 
for X (i.e~~ P > MC), the price line rotates around point P forming 
m 
budget line PT. The new equilibrium position is combination B lying 
on indifference curve I; however, at B there will be unemployed and 
under utilized resources. Elimination of the unemployment and under-
ut'ilization occurs if income increases by PQ to 0Q forming new budget 
line QQ 1 • Society's preferred position with a monopoly sector will be 
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at D which lies on indifference curve II and also on the production 
possibilities curve RR 1 • The welfare loss due to monopoly pricing 
is represented by the shift from III to II. 2 
This welfare loss can also be shown within the framework of demand 
and supply analysis as seen in Figure 6c and 6d and where Figure ~a 
is a scaled-down version of Figure 5. 3 The supply curve is the slope 
of the production possibili ti.es curve RR 1 which represents the oppor-
tunity cost of each product. The demand curve is equal to the slope 
of the indifference. curve at various points along the production 
possibilities curve. For example, at combination D, output in the 
monopoly industry is MD (see Figure 6d) and output in the competitive 
industry is CD (see Figure 6c). At output MD the marginal rate of 
substi tut~on (MRSMC) is greater than the marginal rate of trans-
' 
formation · (MRTMC); the demand price (E in Figure 6d) exceeds the 
supply price (G in Figure 6d) at that output. Similarly, at CD the 
MRTCM and supply price (J in Figure 6c) is ~reater than demand price 
(K in Figure 6c). The welfare loss can be measured by either area 
EGF (Figure 6d) or area JHK (Figure 6c). It also can be noted that 
the price in the monopoly industry (P 1 D in Figure 6d) is higher than 
the price in the competitive industry (denoted by PD in Figure 6c). 
This difference in prices is a result of difference in profits between 
the two industries. 
The welfare loss due to monopely can be estimated by either area 
EGF~ area JHK, or by the difference between indifference curve II 
. ~ 
(with monopoly) and indifference III (without monopoly). Tra-
ditionally 1 welfare loss studies have additionally assumed firms were 
operating under conditions of constant costs. In terms of Figures 5 
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and 6 this means that (1) production possibilities curve RR• would be 
linear and (2) the respective supply curves would be perfectly elastic. 
The resultant welfare loss triangle is presented 1n Figure 7 as area 
ABC. Welfare loss (W) results .from a divergence of price and oppor-
tuni ty (marginal) cost. The area of the triangle is equal to 1/2 (BASE) 
(HEIGHT); thus, the values of AB and BC would provide sufficient 
information to calculate the welfare loss. 
Estimation of Welfare Loss 
A technique for finding the values of AB and ~C was provided in 
a study by Siegfried and Tiemann} The following is derived from 
their exposition. Tj:le line segment AB may be found by c,alcula ting the 
difference between price and long-run marginal cost. Thus, the value 
of AB is given by 
where 
TR/Q = P = price, and M M 
AB TR/~- IRMC 
LRMC = long-run marginal cost. 
( 1) 
Assuming constant costs and calculating economic profit, AB may be 
l 
expressed as 
where I.RVC 
A 
p 
AB = (TR - IRVC - p~ I 
~ 
accounting total variable cost 
book value of assets 
"normal" rate of profit. 
(2) 
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Equation (2) is an estimate of the economic profits per unit of output. 
Mutiplying the expression by PM/PM produces 
AB = I TR - lRVC - pA I 0 p M" 
TR 
( 3) 
Next, estimate the quantity reduction resulting from. monopoly 
restriction of output. The quantity reduction is given by 
BC = AB (dQ/dP), 
if the demand curve is linear between quantities OQM and OQC. 
Multiplying (~) by PM/PM and ~QM produces 
which can be rearranged into 
where~ = price elasticity of demand. 
Welfare loss (W) is expressed as 
W = 1/2 (AB) (BC). 
(J) and (6) ipto (7) produces 
' 
Substituting equations 
w = 112 (c(rR- lRVC- pA) /TR] PM) 2 (~) (QM/PM) 
or 
w 1/2 lRVC - pAJ 
2 
TR 
Limitations of Welfare Loss Estimate 
(TR) (~). 
(~) 
( 5) 
(6) 
(8) 
The welfare loss (W) estimated by equation (9) is only .. one of. 
several sources of welfare losses. that may result from the existence 
of.monopoly power in an economic system. Other losses may arise from 
technical inefficiencies in combining factors of production tog.etber. 
The Pareto optimal condition concerning the combining of resources 
together is given by 
MPP 
ac 
MPP be 
MPP 
am 
MPPbm 
where ~ and ~ are factor inputs and c and m are outputs. If this 
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condition is not satisfied, it implies that the profit motive has been 
insufficient to insure technical efficiency; hence, output could be 
increased without increasing the use of factors of production. 
This can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 8 where it is 
assumed that the shift from monopoly to competition lowers costs from 
LAC to LAC • The triangle ABC is now only a partial measure of welfare 
m c 
loss of monopoly because the shift to competition has also reduced the 
level of costs. The full measure of welfare loss, under this view, is 
measured by triangle AEF. An example of the possible size of this 
addition to welfare loss is provided by Comanor and Leibenstein. 6 They 
assume that actual costs are six per cent below the monopoly price and 
that one-half of the total output of the economy is monopolized. Given 
a price elasticity of 2, triangle ABC would be approximately 0.18 
per cent of total output. If the cost lowering effect from LAC to 
m 
LAC were 18 per cent, the triangle AEF would be about three per cent 
c 
of total output. 
A second type of welfare loss occurs when monopsony power is 
present in the factor markets. The monopsonistic buyer will maximize 
profits by equating the marginal revenue product for~ (MRP ) and the 
a 
marginal resource cost of~ (MRC ). As seen in Figure 9, the 
a 
monopsonist pays a price of only P for a quantity of A1 ; the MRPa 
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at that level of employment is V. Thus, under monopsonistic buying 
conditions, the quantity of the factor used will be restricted and the 
price per unit will be less than the marginal revenue product. The 
effect of the presence of a monopsonistic buyer of factor inputs is 
to shift the production possibilities curve towards the origin. This 
can be seen in Figure 10 where the production possibilities curve 
shifts from RR• to SS• because of monopoly pricing of factor inputs. 
The distortion of factor prices makes indifference curve I, passing 
through points T and U, the highest one attainable. Traditional 
welfare loss measures, such as those used by Harberger, do not include 
any loss due to monopsonistic buying of factor inputs. 7 Worcester 
suggests two approaches for allowing for this problem. First, the 
welfare loss, calculated in the traditional fashion, is multiplied by 
1.2 "to adjust for welfare loss due to monopoly gains achieved by 
workers in the form of higher wages." 8 
The second approach to this problem allows for an expansion of 
total output when the monopoly is eliminated. This can be seen with 
the aid of Figure 11 (which is taken from Figure 6). Initially, output 
in the competitive sector, Xc is CD and the output in the monopoly 
sector, Xm' is ~· Using the average rate of return for the entire 
economy associated with price OPA' the welfare loss area would be EGF 
or JHK. The implication is that, given a stable production possi-
bilities curve, one could expand output in the monopoly sector from 
~ to MA only by reducing output in the competitive sector from CD to 
CA. If, however, that rate of return associated with price OPD were 
the appropriate rate of return for the entire economy, no contraction 
of the competitive sector is necessary; thus, output in the competitive 
-><() R 
.._.. 
II 
l _____ ._ 
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Figure 10. The Effect of Monopsony Power on Production 
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sector would remain at CD. Output in the monopoly sector should, on 
the other hand, expand until the rate of return delines to the com-
petitive level (i.e., that rate of return associated with price OPD). 
For this to occur, output of Xm must expand from MD toM'. The welfare 
loss is now measured by triangle EGL. The elimination of this loss is 
only possible if the production possibilities curve can be shifted to 
the right. Worcester suggests that this larger welfare loss area 
(which arises because of monopoly power in factor markets) can be 
measured by selecting a rate of profit below the average rate of return. 
Thus, Worcester uses a rate of return which is equal to 90 per cent of 
the median in order to allow for the monopoly pricing of factors. 9 
A final, and more controversial point, is that the existence of 
monopoly power may have an adverse effect on technological progress. 
This follows if monopolists have less incentive for developing new 
products and improving production processes than do competitive firms. 10 
Equation (9) does not measure any of these potential adverse effects. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework from which an 
estimate of, the welfare loss triangle can be made. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of some reasons why the welfare loss 
triangle may underestimate the welfare loss due to monopoly. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF WELFARE LOSS 
Introduction 
The purpose of an industry~by-industry examination of welfare 
loss is to determine if the bulk of the loss due to monopoly is 
concentrated in relatively few industries. The following section 
spmmarizes previous studies which have found, in general, that the 
welfare loss due to monopoly is relatively small. The next section 
will present in the United States for 1967 estimates of welfare loss 
for selected manufacturing industries. Finally, the results of this 
study are compared to earlier estimates. 
Review of the Literature 
Estimations of welfare loss were .. first reported in a 1954 study 
1 by Arnold Harberger. Looking at seventy-three (73) manufacturing 
industries for .the period 1924-1929, Harberge:r estimated that the 
welfare loss due to monopoly was less than 0.1 per cent of national 
income. In 1967 this would have amounted to less than $.7 billion. 
The Harberger study has been criticized on several general points. 
First, the assumption of a unitary elasticity of demand can be 
questioned because it implied that a monopolist would operate where 
. 1 . 2 marg1na revenue 1s zero. Second, Harberger 1 s use of the average 
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rate of profit in the manufacturing sector as a proxy for the "normal" 
rate of return causes a biased downward estimate because some economic 
profits are included in this average. Finally, it has been observed 
that some monopoly profits are capitalized in such a manner that only 
competitive rates of return are being earned. 3 
David Schwartzman attempted to generate a new set of welfare loss 
estimates in response to the criticisms of Harberger. 4 Using the same 
framework as Harberger, Schwartzman used estimates of profits for the 
year 1954 and he assumed a price elasticity of demand of 2. His 
findings were that "the welfare loss is less than $234 million; or less 
than 0.1 per cent of the national income in 1954. 115 
David Kamerschen made another estimate of the welfare loss due to 
monopoly using a loss equation similar to that of Harberger and 
6 Schwartzman. Kamerschen made several adjustments in data for a five 
year period between 1956-57 and 1960-61 to approximate a long-run 
period. In addition to the new profit data, Kamerschen made a further 
refinement by estimating the elasticity of demand for the selected 
industries. This contrasts with Harberger and Schwartzman who had 
assumed the price elasticity of demand to be 1 and 2 respectively. 
Kamerschen found that the welfare loss ranged from $4 billion to 
$31 billion (between one per cent and eight per cent of national 
income). In comparing this results with Harberger-Schwartzman, 
Kamerschen estimates the welfare loss to be about $7.2 billion or 
1.9 per cent of national income. 
William Shepherd has argued that the misallocation burden of 
monopoly is between two and three per cent of national income 
(approximately $16 billion of welfare loss in 1966). 7 His estimate 
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is derived from assuming (1) profits increase one per cent for each 
10 concentration points, (2) that the price elasticity of demand is 
unitary, (3) the output restriction (d~e to monopoly) will be one per 
cent for each 10 concentration points, (4) at low concentration (30 
per cent), the output restriction (or price) effect is negligible, and 
(5) degree of output restriction varies linearly between zero (at 
30 per cent concentration) and 10 per cent of sales (at 100 per cent 
concentration). Given these assumptions and using concentration ratios 
(adjusted by Shepherd for regional markets and imports) for each 
industry, Shepherd observes that 11by conservative estimate ••• the 
direct loss (distinct from X-inefficiency) is not less than one per 
8 
cent and probably between two and three per cent." 
F. M. Scherer estimates the welfare loss due to monopoly to be 
around 0.9 per cent of GNP (approximately $7 billion in 1966). 9 He 
points out, however, that this figure is "only the tip of the iceberg" 
and that other welfare losses amount to over five per Gent of 1966 GNP 
($39.7 billion). The other losses cited by Scherer are (1) those due 
to pricing distortions in regulated sectors ($4.5 billion), (2) those 
due to deficient cost controls ($19 billion), (4) wasteful promotional 
efforts such as advertising and styling changes ($7 billion), (4) 
excess capacity due to industrial caterlization ($4.5 billion), and 
(5) all others ($4 billion). Scherer concludes: 
While each of the individual estimates is subject to a 
wide margin of error, it seems improbable that the true 
combined social cost of monopoly, if it could be as-
certained, would prove to be less than half or more than 
twice the estimated total of 6.2 per cent i.e. between 
$23.2 billion and $93.0 billion ••• [T]he static 
inefficiency burden of monopoly does not appear to be 
overwhelming. But it is also not so slight that it 
can be ignored. 10 
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Frederick Bell, using 1954 data, found that the welfare loss 
from monopoly in the manufacturing sector averaged about .OJ per cent of 
national income (i.e., $97 million in 1954). 11 This figure was 
obtained by developing an equation to estimate the deadweight loss 
triangle and assuming a price elasticity of demand 1.5. Bell's 
results can be compared to those of Schwartzman by assuming a price 
elasticity of two. For Bell's data and assuming a price elasticity of 
demand of two, the total welfare l,oss would be about $'130 million 
(.04 per cent of 1954 national income); this is about one-half the 
size found by Schwartzman. The difference is due to the estimated 
price impact of monopoly. Schwartzman's estimate was 8.3 per cent 
while Bell's was only 1.94 per cent. The. higher value by Schwartzman 
is a result of identifying the monopoly sector as one in which the 
four firm concentration ratio exceeds 50 per cent. The price impact 
for this group of industries would be expected to be greater than the 
price impact for the whole of manufacturing. 
Dean Worcester in a 1973 study, using data for the 500 largest 
firms, estimated the welfare loss due to monopoly at about O.JJ per cent 
of national income over the fourteen year period between 1956 and 
1969. 12 Worcester concluded: 
The 0.329 per cent is more than 4.1 times Harberger•s 
estimate of 0.08 per cent, but it is still small, less 
than two months of normal'growth ••• ,I can conclude 
that there is little ground for the common belief that 
a large loss of welfare exists due to the economic 
impact of monopoly power. 
Summary 
The original measurement of welfare loss for the United States 
was by Arnold Harberger. Subsequent estimates of the' cost of monopoly 
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due to allocative inefficiencies have been in the range of 0.1 to 8 
per cent o·f national income. The majority of the studies have placed 
the loss at less than two per cent of national income. 
Results for 115 Manufacturing Industries 
In this section is an interindustry examination of welfare loss 
for 115 manufacturing industries. The model developed in Chapter IV 
provides the framework for the welfare loss measures. The various 
data sources and assumptions necessary for estimating welfare loss 
are presented in this section. Five measures of welfare loss are 
given. 
Using equation (9) from Chapter IV, an estimate of welfare loss 
can be derived. Equation (9) is written 
where 
TR 
w 1/2 
LRVC 
TR ( TR) ( Tl ) 
Value of shipments for the four-digit industry in 1967, 
LRVC Total direct costs (i.e., costs of materials, labor costs, 
rental payments), 
p = 11Normal 11 rate of returp (assumed to be equal to 10 per cent 
of the stock of capita'!), 
A = Stock of capital for the industry., and 
Tl Price elasticity of demand (assumed to be equal to one). 
A shortcoming of the above welfare loss equation is that it provides an 
estimate using before-tax income rather than after-tax income. This 
llto 
criticism has been noted by at least one study. An after-tax income 
will provide the most relevant estimate of welfare loss. 
To obtain an estimate of after-tax income, data from a study by 
John Siegfried15 is used. In this study Siegfried derives the 
effective tax rates for U. S. corporations by IRS codes for the year 
1963. These effective tax rates will be used to calculate an after-
tax income for the respective four-digit industry groups. Thus, the 
welfare loss equation to be estimated is 
1/2 
where 
LRVC - TX - pA 
TR 
J 2 (TR) (~) 
TX = total corporation income tax by four-digit industry class, 
and all the other terms are defined above. 
A number of assumptions about the industry are necessary for 
estimating W. These assumptions16 are: 
1. firms are producing under conditions of constant costs, 
2. industries are in long.,...run equilibrium (i.e., accounting 
values are near.economic values), 
J. no redistributional effects are present or, alternatively, 
that whatever redistribution of income occurs is not a 
welfare loss, 17 
4. the SIC four-digit industries are close approximations to 
theoretical industries, 
5. producers are operating at lowest possible cost, 
6. industries are producing for direct consumption, 18 and 
7. long-run profits are identified as monopoly profits. 
Assumption number 6 above eliminates the possibility of monopoly 
distortions being transmitted through vertical price flows. Consider 
two industries, A and B, each with total sales of $1 million per year 
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and constant long-run marginal costs of $900,000. Assuming unitary 
elasticity of demand and substituting into equation (9), total welfare 
loss in A and B would be $10,000 per year. If industry B purchased 
$450,000 of output from industry A, the long-run marginal social cost 
of B1 s output is only $855,000 (i.e., $450,000 + .9 X 450,000 = 
$855,000). The welfare loss estimate increases to $13012.5 ($2500 on 
final sales by A plus $10,512.5 on final sales by B). 
011:'." attempt to measure the effect on welfare loss of this inter- v 
dependence is the .study by Michael Klass. 19 Klass' study, summarized 
20 briefly by Scherer, reports that under certain conditions vertical 
price flows actually reduce the. total welfare loss due to monopoly. 
However, using more sophisticated measurement of the monopoly dis-
tortions, the impact of vertical price flows is to increase welfare 
loss estimates by roughly 40 per cent. It is not clear what effect 
the vertical price distortions have on the welfare loss estimates 
presented below. 
Using the basic equation for W; five separate estimates of welfare 
loss are derived for 115 four-digit industry classes in 1967. One 
estimate, w1 , is for before-tax profits and uses total stock of capital 
data from the Census of Manufacturers. The estimate for W is identical 
2 
to w1 above except it uses total stock of capital data reported in the 
Enterprise Statistics. 21 The estimate, W, is like W except it uses 3 2 
"adjusted" value of shipments. The fourth estimate, w4, uses after-
tax profits and data from the census as a proxy for the stock of 
capital. Finally, w5 uses after-tax profits and data reported in 
the Enterprise Statistics to measure the stock of capital. These 
welfare loss estimates are summarized in Table XII. 
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TABlE XII 
AGGREGATE WELFARE LOSS ESTIMATES, 1967 
Welfare Loss for Welfare Loss for 
ll5 Industries all Manufacturing 
Method (Millions of $) %of VA (Millions of $) %of NI 
wl 5483.403 5.34 13,440.986 2.06 
w2 4380.954 4.26 10,738.638 1.64 
W3 4652.951 4.53 ll ,405. 352 1.75 
w4 1688.615 1.64 4,139.151 o.63 
w5 1102.627 1.07 2,702.751 0.41 
The before-tax estimates range between $4.7 billion and $5.5 
billion which represents between 4 .• 3 and 5. 3 per cent of the value-
added in the 115 industries. If this per cent of welfare loss were 
found in the entire manufacturing sector, the annual dollar cost would 
be between $10.7 and $12.4 billion. These before-tax welfare losses 
22 
may be compared to those found by Kamerschen. His model that is 
closest to the before-tax models discussed above is model V; in that 
model, using price elasticity of demand equal to unity, he finds a 
welfare loss equal to over four per cent of national income (in 1967 
this would be over 26 billion). The before-tax models (W1 , w2 , w3 ), 
give losses of around two per cent of national income. Thus, the 
before-tax Kamerschen model V estimates losses at around two times 
the size of values suggested by this data. 
The after-tax estimates are presented in Table XII as w4 and w5 • 
The after-tax welfare loss estimates range from $1.1 and $1.7 
billion; this represents from 1 to 1.6 per cent of the value~added in 
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the 115 industries. If this percentage welfare loss were the same for 
all manufacturing, the 1967 welfare loss would be between $2.7 and $4.1 
billion. Kamerschen 1 s mode1 I is the one most similar to Models w4 
and w5 ; his estimate for the 1956-1961 period is about 1.6 per cent of 
t . 1 . 23 na 1ona 1ncome. 
Estimates w4 and w5 amount to about 0.5 per cent of 1967 national 
income. 24 These figures compare favorably to those of Scherer, and 
25 Worcester. Thus, the aggregate welfare loss estimates generated by 
this model and using primarily Census data gives values that are 
consistent with other studies using different techniques and data 
sources. 
The figures in Table XIII are the inter-industry comparisons of 
the welfare loss for all five measures. The five measures are closely 
related to one another with the simple correlation coefficients as: 
0.95, r 23 0.99, 
r24 = o.BJ, r25 0.97, r 34 0.86. 
SIC Code 
2011 
2013 
2015 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2026 
2031 
2032 
2033 
2034 
2035 
2036 
2037 
2041 
2042 
2043 
2044 
2045 
2046 
2051 
2052 
20p 
2071 
2072 
2073 
2082 
2083 
2084 
2085 
2086 
2087 
2091 
2092 
2093 
2094 
2095 
2096 
2098 
2099 
TABLE XIII 
WELFARE LOSS ESTIMATES BY FOUR-DIGIT INDUSTRY CLASS 
FOR 115 SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1967 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLI.ARS) 
w1 w W3 w4 2 
13.12 8.21 10.81 4.95 
10.56 6.95 3.86 4.07 
6.09 3.88 4.05 2.J1 
1.09 0.61 0.70 0.23 
2.01 1.26 1.40 0.46 
25.08 21.79 19.35 7.88 
15.34 11.25 9-36 4.10 
55-94 42.82 50-75 15.56 
7-43 6.09 7-57 1.74 
52.49 44.44 50.83 12.77 
80.49 64.73 69.66 18.44 
8.85 6.86 6.40 1.94 
15.48 12.80 13.22 3.66 
3.91 3.13 3-29 0.86 
29.22 21.79 22.45 8.07 
16.06 12.90 13.65 4.31 
59.99 50.94 53-94 17-17 
72.23 51.61 57.18 22.49 
4.03 3.42 3.42 1.15 
22.05 19.84 19.84 6.75 
15.42 8.33 9.68 2.58 
93.47 88.58 104.62 23.30 
6o.o6 57.84 58.45 16.21 
18.87 13.12 13.12 2.61 
47.58 !44. 77 46.19 10.99 
12.94 12.00 11.43 2.82 
28.93 27.87 31.13 7.30 
99.83 91.34 92.28 22.51 
0.38 0.27 0.30 0.02 
19.09 14.54 14.38 5-57 
104.85 22.46 24.59 27.82 
78.65 55.60 58.87 24.30 
114.71 107.68 104.69 43.35 
0.38 0.36 0.40 0~08 
3.20 3.14 3.87 1.39 
1.30 1.29 1.48 0.61 
5-lJ 5.03 3.96 2.20 
73.09 68.11 68.11 27.46 
13.44 13.27 13.54 6.23 
6.7J 5.43 5.43 2.20 
83.43 73-50 73-50 '29-74 
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w5 
2.15 
1.97 
1.05 
0.04 
0.15 
6.09 
2.13 
9.06 
1.13 
8.96 
11.34 
1.08 
2.43 
0.52 
4.42 
2.75 
12.50 
11.75 
0.84 
5-55 
0.32 
20.90 
15.06 
o.8o 
9.66 
2.39 
6.77 
18.58 
o.oo 
3.25 
0.05 
12.38 
39.06 
0.07 
1.34 
0.59 
2.13 
24.43 
6.11 
1.48 
23.93 
92 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
SIC Code w1 w2 W3 w4 w5 
2812 9.11 8.64 9-99 0.41 0.31 
2813 37-35 36.52 39.56 7.26 6.89 
2815 24.04 55-72 53.77 3.61 19.91 
2816 21.75 21.40 20.96 5.16 4.98 
2818 244.30 239.52 275-77 52.17 49.97 
2819 161.80 159-33 182.01 39-76 38.53 
2821 68.32 61.99 45.79 11.46 8.95 
2822 23.07 21.36 19.70 4.54 3-79 
2823 18.97 16.90 22.40 2.70 1.95 
2824 67.43 60.48 62.29 10.23 7.64 
2831 .4.43 0./36 o.62 0.91 0.05 
2833 22.20 7-94 5-95 5.23 0.15 
2834 729-73 555.07 629.72 213.01 124.13 
2841 214.72 183.14 215.80 77.85 59.32 
2842 109.42 98.51 101.31 40.67 34.13 
2843 5.63 2.70 1.97 1.60 0.28 
2844 383.42 332.56 299.40 111.05 84.51 
2851 77.96 55.68 59-96 20.42 9-93 
2861 5-35 1.93 2.03 1.01 o.oo 
2871 14.98 14.74 . 19.00 5.9J 5.78 
2872 5.22 5.17 6.4J 2.43 2.40 
2879 36.44 36.31 35.55 19.11 19.01 
2891 12.77 8.00 7-73 3.72 1.39 
2892 8.23 4.37 11.38 2.24 0.52 
2893 6.83 4.34 4.75 2.00 0.77 
2895 9.96 3.13 3.13 2.26 0.01 
2899 63.38 42.68 ' 41.19 18.98 8.58 
3611 33.44 4.73 4.80 7.81 0.66 
3612 32.62 1.51 1.58 7.18 3.25 
3613 56.69 14.71 15.55 13.86 o.oo 
3621 48.16 47.41 49.12 10.83 10.47 
3622 38.21 37.84 38.95 9.54 9-35 
3623 14.34 14.19 16.17 3.54 3.46 
3624 7.11 6.83 6.84 0.93 0.82 
3629 5.38 3.29 4.36 1.18 1.14 
3631 7.64 4.53 3.95 1.94 0.57 
3632 26.40 15.12 27.34 6.60 1.74 
3633 21.99 14.32 25.10 5.80 2.26 
3634 39.20 31.02 32.14 11.26 7.10 
3635 20.74 17.16 10.78 6.08 4.22 
3636 4.25 1.80 1.90 0.94 0.06 
3639 10.53 7-09 6.67 2.82 1.20 
3641 61.53 63.24 65.37 16.73 17.62 
3642 35.49 36.80 38.01 9.18 9.86 
3643 27.55 28.49 30.19 7.24 7-72 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
SIC Code wl w2 W3 wit w5 
36ltlt 16.62 17.3lt 20.16 it .16 lt.52 
3651 lt7.77 17.3lt 19.69 13.82 0.9lt 
3652 11.99 2.70 2.75 3.32 o.oo 
3661 ltlt.9lt lt3.6lt 50.29 llt.26 13.lt9 
3662 85.59 83.93 95.97 29.65 28.68 
3671 9.ltlt 5.36 6.37 Lt.91 2.13 
3672 32.lt9 20.38 22.16 17.21 8.77 
3673 lt.29 1.60 1.63 2.09 o.ltl 
367ft 8.06 0.79 0.78 3-39 0.01 
3679 72.36 ltlt.09 lt7.97 38.12 18.55 
3691 6.lt2 2.25 2.25 1.22 0.01 
3692 20.29 25.ltO llt.lt5 5.13 2.8lt 
3693 7.ltlt 5.13 6.66 1.81 0.78 
369ft 26.75 13.lt8 15.30 5-75 0.81 
3699 5.87 3.66 2.10 1.37 o.ltlt 
3711 2lt7.90 223.32 235.17 67.03 5lt.56 
3713 133.29 9.20 10.90 166.62 19.32 
371ft 233.18 2llt.ltlt 212.lt0 70.79 65.90 
3715 5.38 1.36 1.38 1.32 o.oo 
3721 61.57 63.99 77-31 llt.72 15.92 
3722 lt8.39 26.03 28.79 10.08 1. 7ft 
3729 53.32 3lt.99 29.6lt 12.lt7 lt.6o 
3731 lt.62 3.lt9 3-73 0.69 0.31 
3732 21.98 9.9lt 12.05 5.lt2 o.63 
37lt2 1.60 0.91 0.9lt 0.15 3.38 
3751 it .12 2.ltlt 2.79 1.12 0.35 
3791 8.lt8 6.25 6.38 2.50 1.36 
3799 3.27 2.19 1.82 0.93 o.lto 
Table XIV presents the ten industries which have the largest welfare 
loss by each of the five measures. Depending on the measure used, 
these ten industries account for between ito and 53 per cent of the 
total welfare loss.within the 115 industries. 26 The four-digit 
industries which account for a sizeable portion of the welfare loss 
are: Pharmaceutical Preparations (283ft), Toilet Preparations (28ltlt), 
TABlE XIV 
INDUSTRIES WITH THE LARGEST WELFARE LOSS 
wl w2 w w4 w 
Amount Amatmt 3Amount Amount 5Amount 
Industry (in millions $) Industry (in millions $) Industry (in millions $) Industry (in millions $) Industry (in millions $) 
2834 729.73 2834 555•07 2834 629.72 28)4 21).01 2834 124.13 
2844 J8J.42 2841. JJ2.56 28,.,. 299.4o 3713 166.62 28,.,. 84.51 
J7ll 247.90 )818 275-77 2818 275· 77 2844 lll.05 3714 65.90 
2818 2)9.52 J7ll 22).)2 J7ll 235.17 2841 77-85 2841 59.33 
3714 22).18 3714 214.44 2841 215.8o 3714 70-79 J7ll 54.56 
2841 214.72 2841 18).14 3714 212.4o J7ll 67.03 2818 49.97 
2819 161.8o 2819. 159.33 2819 182.01 2818 52.17 2087 39.07 
3713 1)).29 2087 107.68 2o87 104.69 2o87 4J.J5 2819 )8.54 
2087 ll4.71 2842 98.51 2051 104.62 2842 4o.67 2842 34.14 
2842 109.42 2082 91.35 2842 101.)1 2819 39-76 3662 28.68 
Total Loss 2557.69 1741.17 2J6o.89 782.3 578.83 
%of Welfare 46.64 39-74 50.74 46.JJ 52.50 
Soaps (2841), Industrial Organic Chemicals, N.E.C. (2818), Motor 
Vehicles (3711), and Motor Vehicle Parts (3714). These results 
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suggest that sizeable benefits of industry-wide reorganization are 
concentrated in a relatively few industries. Any policy design to 
reduce this deadweight loss must also compare these potential benefits 
to the costs of the policy. 
Only one other study has formally looked at inter-industry welfare 
loss; the study is by Siegfried and Tiemann. 27 Their procedure was 
identical to that used in this paper. The data source for their study 
were 124 IRS minor industries which roughly correspond to the three-
digit SIC classification. Their estimate of the total welfare loss of 
monopoly in mining and manufacturing was 0.07 per cent of national 
income. 
Their comparison of welfare loss estimates between the industry 
groupings found that most of the loss was accounted for in three 
industries ~-Plastic materials (SIC 281), Drugs (SIC 283), and Motor 
Vehicles and Parts (SIC 371). As seen in Table XV, two of the above 
groups--Drugs and Motor Vehicles--also rank as high sources of welfare 
loss in this study. Table XV compares the findings of Siegfried-
Tiemann with those of the present study. The four-digit SIC code 
industries are grouped into their appropriate three digit IRS classi-
fication. Then, the welfare losses are stated as a per cent of total 
welfare loss for the industries covered in the Bumpass study. The 
Bumpass figures give losses that are about five times those of 
Siegfried-Tiemann (0.07 per cent of national income to 0.41 per cent 
of national income for w5 ). The Spearman rank correlation between 
the two studies is 0.33 (significant at the five per cent level). 
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TABlE XV 
COHPARISON OF WELFARE LOSS ESTH1ATES FOR 
SIEGFRIED-TIEMANN AND BUMPASS 
Industry 
Heat Products 
Dairy Products 
Canned and Frozen Foods 
Grain Hill Products 
Bakery Products 
Sugar 
Confectionary Products 
Halt Liquors and Malt 
Wines, Brandy, Brandy 
Spirits 
Distilled Liquor 
Bottled Soft Drinks 
Vegetable and Animal Oils 
Food and Kindred Products 
NEC, NA 
Basic Chemicals 
SIC ,Code 
IRS Code 
201 
2010 
202 
2020 
203 
2030 
204 
2040 
205 
2050 
206 
2060 
207 
2070 
2082,2083 
2082 
2084 
2084 
2085 
2085 
2086,2087 
2086 
2091-4, 2096 
2091 
2095, 2097-9 
2098, 2099 
281 
2811 
Per Cent Welfare Loss for b 
Siegfried-Tiemanna Bumpass 
0.07 0.47 
0.01 1.58 
0.02 2.71 
0.10 3.06 
o.oo 3.26 
0.16 0.07 
0.53 1.71 
0.07 1.68 
0.01 0.29 
0.17 0.00 
0.72 4.67 
0.31 0.93 
1.16 4.52 
0.03 
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TABLE XV (Continued 
Industry 
Plastic Materials and 
Synthetics 
Drugs 
Soap 
Toiletries 
Paints, Gum and Wood Chemical 
Agricultural Chemicals 
Chemical Products, MIS 
Electrical Transmission 
and Distribution 
Electrical Industry 
Apparatus 
Household Appliances 
Radio and TV Receivers 
Communication Equipment 
Electronic Components 
Lighting and Wiring Equipment 
Electrical Machinery, 
NEC, NA 
SIC Code 
IRS Code 
282 
2812 
283 
2830 
2841-3 
2841 
2844 
2842 
2851, 2861 
2850 
287 
2870 
2898, 2899 
361 
3611 
362 
3612 
363 
3630 
365 
3650 
366 
3661 
367 
3662 
369 
3698, 3699 
Per Cent Welfare Loss for b 
Siegfried-Tiemanna Bumpass 
2.03 
5-59 11.28 
0.82 8.50 
1.09 7.66 
0.14 0.90 
0.36 
1.19 1.02 
1.35 0.35 
0.07 2.29 
0.02 1.56 
0.01 0.09 
1.40 3.82 
0.66 2.71 
0.03 3.60 
0.44 
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TABlE XV (Continued) 
Industry 
SIC Code 
IRS Code 
Per Cent WelfareaLoss .for b 
Siegfried-Tiemann Bumpass 
:Motor Vehicles 
& Parts 
37ll, 3713, 3714, 
Aircraft, Complete 
Missiles 
Aircraft Parts 
Ship and Boat Building 
Railroad Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
NEC 
37ll 
3721 
3721 
3722-3, 3729 
3722 
373 
3730 
374 
3791 
3751, 379 
3798 
3715 75.77 12.68 
0.08 1.44 
0.04 0.58 
0.25 0.12 
0.08 0.36 
0.03 0.19 
aJohn J. Siegfried and Thomas K. Tiemann, "The Welfare Cost of 
Monopoly: An Inter-Industry Approach," Economic Inguiry (June, 1974). 
bFigures are for Bumpass estimate w5 • 
A study by the Federal Trade Commission reported by Paul Scanlon 
in 1972 examined welfare loss by four-digit industry classes for 
1967. 28 The study first estimated the monopoly margin which was equal 
to industry profits minus the opportunity cost of capital expressed as 
a percentage of company sales. The opportunity cost of capital was 
chosen to be five per cent of stockholders equity (after-taxes). In 
addition, estimates were made regarding probable inefficiencies in 
these industries. These two estimates, the monopoly margin and 
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probable inefficiencies, were combined into an adjusted profit margin; 
the adjusted profit margin is the difference between the actual and the 
competitive price. These adjusted profit margins are then used in the 
traditional welfare loss formula to generate estimates for individual 
four-digit industries. 
An error is made in the article in calculating these estimates. 
Welfare loss (W) equals one-half the square of the adjusted profit 
margin (t) 2 , times value of shipments (s), times elasticity of demand 
(n), or W = 1/2 (t) 2 S(n).·. The welfare loss estimates are made, 
however, nby simply multiplying the Federal Trade Commission percentage 
estimate of the monopoly margin times the industry's sales Volume" 
(p• 22). Clearly, the correct calculation is the square of the margin 
times the sales volume. These figures are given in column 2 of 
Table XVI. 
Finally, it is useful to determine the relationship between the 
five measures of welfare loss and seller concentration (CR). Seller 
concentration is the proxy frequently used to determine the presence 
or absence of monopoly. Because of this emphasis on CR a test of the 
correlation between the two provides a simple test of the former's 
efficacy in estimating the latter. The model investigated is 
W = a + b CR 
where 
W = welfare loss estimate and 
CR four-firm concentration ratio •. 
SIC Code 
3711 
3714 
2011 
2834 
2818 
2819 
2026 
2086 
2042 
2082 
2051 
2821 
2841 
3731 
2844 
2033 
2851 
3621 
3613 
2071 
2041 
2085 
2037 
3612 
3642 
2062 
2823 
2032 
3611 
3791 
2052 
3641 
2812 
3721 
3713 
3671 
3673 
2831 
Total 
TABlE XVI 
COMPARISON WELFARE LOSS ESTIMATES FOR FTC AND BUMPASS 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
FTC 
226.57 
46.92 
14.99 
30.38 
19.79 
17.31 
8.39 
17.10 
8.47 
13.25 
7.21 
9-57 
11.99 
10.21 
9.52 
6.00 
6.85 
5.81 
7.12 
4.85. 
3.24 
5.86 
3.50 
5-75 
3.92 
3-79 
5.63 
3.83 
3.26 
2.66 
2.58 
3.25 
2.89 
1.93 
1.23 
1.80 
1.47 
0.04 
538.93 
100 
BUMPASS 
54.56 
65.90 
2.15 
124.13 
38.53 
38.53 
9.06 
12.38 
12.50 
18.58 
20.90 
8.95 
59-32 
o. 31 
84.51 
11.34 
9-93 
10.47 
o.oo 
9.66 
2.75 
0.05 
4.42 
3.25 
9.86 
o.8o 
1.95 
8.96 
0.66 
1.36 
15.06 
17.62 
0.31 
15.92 
19.32 
2.12 
0.41 
0.05 
707-98 
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The results (shown in Table XVII) indicate that for these 115 
industries the four-firm concentration ratio is not a useful indicator 
of welfare loss. This contrasts with Kamershen 1 s findings of a simple 
correlation between welfare loss and CR of 0.56. Kamershen 1 s study 
used data aggregated at the two-digit SIC level, while the present 
study utilizes four-digit data. 
Dependent Variable 
wl 
w2 
w3 
w4 
w5 
TABlE XVII 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WELFARE LOSS 
AND SELlER CONCENTRATION 
CR Intercept 
-0.195 57.08 
(0.54) 
-0.095 42.67 
(O.J2) 
-0.81 44.J6 
(0.25) 
-0.124 20.68 
( 1.02) 
-0.026 10.85 
(O.J5) 
R2 
o.oo 
o.oo 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
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Summary 
Estimates of welfare loss in 115 U. S. manufacturing industries 
have been presented in this section. Welfare loss (before-taxes) for 
these industries was between $4.4 billion and $5.5 billion; welfare 
loss (after-taxes) was between $1.1 billion and $1.7 billion. These 
aggregate welfare loss values were similar to those of earlier authors 
using different data sources. Around .one-half of this welfare loss 
was centered in only ten of the 115 industries. Thus, the aggregate 
welfare loss value is outside the 11 steak-dinner range''' ($67 per person 
using w1 measure and $21 per person using w5 ), and the great bulk of 
this loss is accounted for by a relatively few industries. For anti-
trust policy, these welfare loss values.may be viewed as potential 
benefits from a reduction in monopoly power. These potential benefits 
must be compared to the costs of the antitrust policy. 
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l)Ibid., pp. 240-244. 
14 Kamerschen, p. 229~ 
, l5J J S · · d "E ' A U S C t. I ohn • 1egfr1e , ffect1ve verage • • orpora 10n ncome 
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Samuelson (P. A. Samuelson, "Constancy of the Marginal Utility of 
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Lange, editor (Chicago, 19~2), pp. 75-91) and shown to be unnecessary 
by Winch (David M. Winch, 11Consumer 1 s Surplys and Compensation 
Principles," American Economic Review, 55 (June, 1965), pp. 395-~23. 
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19Michael Klass, "Inter-Industry Relations and the Impact of 
Monopoly" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 
1970.) 
20 Scherer, pp. ~03-~0~. 
21 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Enterprise Statistics: ~-
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971. The values on the total 
stock of capital were. 1.6 times greater in the Enterprise Statistics 
than reported in the Census of Manufacturers. The simple correlation 
coefficient between the two measures is 0.79. 
22 Kamerschen, p. 231. This study uses average data from the IRS 
over the period 1956-1961 for corporations, partnerships, and sole 
proprietorships. 
23Ib' 1d., p. 230. 
2~ Scherer, p. ~08. 
25worcester, p. 2~0. 
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industries will bias the welfare loss estimates. This bias will be 
most important in industries that are in research and development, 
and advertising intensive. See Douglas L. Cocks, "Comment on the 
Welfare Cost of Monopoly: An Inter-Industry Analysis," Economic 
Inquiry (forthcoming) for an attempt to measure the size of this bias 
for the pharmaceutical industry. 
27John J. Siegfried and Thomas K. Tiemann, 11 The Welfare Cost of 
Monopoly," Economic Inquiry, 12 (June, 197~), pp. 19,0-202. 
28 Paul D. Scanlon, 11 FTC and Phase II: The McGovern Papers," 
Antitrus't Law and Economics Review, 5 (Spring, 1972), pp. 19-36. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study has provided evidence concerning the structure-
per.formance hypothesis. Some features of the statistical evidence 
from the models are as follows: 
1. The structure-performance model receives its strongest support 
for the Food and Kindred Products group (SIC 20). The relationship 
between seller concentration and price-cost margins is strongest for 
this group of industires. 
2. The adjusted price-cost margin generates superior results .in 
almost all models tested. Two separate measures of capital intensity 
were considered. One measure, using the ratio.of total assets to 
output (TAO), provided consistently better results than did the 
commonly used ratio of gross book value to output (KO). 
J. The significance of the minimum efficient size plant (MES) 
variable received strong support in two groups, Food and Kindred 
Products (SIC 20) and Transportation Equipment (SIC J?). In Chemicals 
and Allied Products (SIC 28) the sign of MES was opposite to the~ 
priori expectation. 
4. Product differentiation (PRD) .receives strong empirical 
support in two of the two-digit subgroups, SIC 20 and SIC 28 with the 
sign of the regression coefficient consistent with the theoretical 
expectation. 
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5. The signs of the regression coefficient for growth in demand 
variable are, in general, positive; this is in accord with the hypothe-
sized relationship. In less than one-fourth of the cases is the 
estimated coefficient significantly different from zero. The evidence 
in this study fails to support the view that there is a differential 
affect of growth on price-cost margins in oligopolistic industries. 
6. The import competition variable (I) generates the expected 
relationship for SIC 20 and SIC 28. The sign for I in SIC 36, 37 and 
for the producer subgroup in SIC 28 was opposite the expected relation-
ship. Two explanations for this result are (1) a disequilibrium 
situation is being observed and/or (2) the imports are made up of 
component parts which are used as inputs for final processing. Either 
of these cases would give a positive relationship between price-cost 
margin and import competition. 
7. The geographic market index variable (GM) is not significant 
in any of the models examined. 
Welfare losses due to monopoly were also calculated for 115 
manufacturing industries. This study is one of the first to. present 
welfare loss estimates by four-digit SIC classification. The major 
results from the welfare loss section are: 
8. The aggregate welfare loss for the industires examined ranges 
between $5.5 billion for the before-tax estimate and $1.1 billion for 
the after-tax estimate. Extrapolated to the economy as a whole, this 
amounts to between two per cent and 0.4 per cent of 1967 national 
income. 
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9. While the after-tax aggregate welfare loss is relatively low, 
representing about two months real growth, the distribution of this 
loss is concentrated in a relatively few industries. Specifically, 
just 10 of the four-digit industries account for almost one-half of the 
total welfare loss due to monopoly. 
10. A final finding of the paper is that the simple correlation 
between monopoly welfare loss and seller concentration is extremely 
low. This suggests that seller concentration alone is a poor proxy 
for monopoly profit. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A 
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION AND 
INDUSTRY NAMES 
115 
SIC Code 
2001 
2002 
2015 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2031 
2032 
2033 
2034 
2035 
2036 
2037 
2041 
2042 
2043 
2044 
2045 
2046 
2051 
2052 
206 
2071 
2072 
2073 
208~ 
208) 
2084 
2085 
2086 
2087 
2091 
2092 
2093 
2094 
2095 
2096 
2097 
2098 
2099 
116 
Industry Name 
Meatpacking Plants 
Sausages and other Prepared Meats 
Poultry Dressing Plants 
Creamery Butter 
Cheese, Natural Processed 
Condensed and Evaporated Milk 
Ice Cream and Frozen Desserts 
Canned and Cured Seafoods 
Canned Specialities 
Canned Fruits and Vegetables 
Dehydrated Food Products 
Pickles, Sauces, and Salad 
Dressings 
Fresh or Frozen Packaged Fish 
Frozen Fruits and Vegetables 
Flour and Other Grain Mill Products 
Prepared Feeds for Animals and 
Fowls 
Cereal Preparations 
Rice Milling 
Blended and Prepared Flour 
Wet Corn Milling 
Bread, Cake, and Related Products 
Cookies and Crackers 
Sugar 
Confectionery Products 
Chocolate and Cocoa Products 
Chewing Gum 
Malt Liquors 
Malt 
Wines, Brandy, and Brandy Spirits 
Distilled Liquor, Except Brandy 
Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks 
Flavoring Extracts and Syrups, Nee 
Cottonseed Oil Mills 
Soybean Oil Mills 
Vegetable Oil Mills, Nee 
Animal and Marine Fats and Oils 
Roasted Coffee 
Shortening and Cooking Oils 
Manufactured Ice 
Macaroni and Spaghetti 
Food Preprarations, Nee. 
SIC Code 
2812 
2813 
2815 
2816 
2818 
2819 
2821 
2822 
2823 
2824 
2841 
2842 
2843 
2844 
2851 
2861 
2871 
2872 
2879 
2891 
2892 
2893 
2895 
2899 
3611 
3612 
3613 
3621 
3622 
3623 
3624 
3629 
3631 
3632 
3633 
3634 
3635 
3636 
3639 
Industry Name 
Alkalies and Chlorine 
Industrial Gases 
Cyclic Intermediates and Crudes 
Inorganic Pigments 
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Industrial Organic Chemicals, Nee 
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, Nee 
Plastics Materials and Resins 
Synthetic Rubber 
Cellulosic Manmade Fibers 
Organic Fibers, Noncellulosic 
Soap and other Detergents 
Polishes and Sanitation Goods 
Surface Active Agents 
Toilet Preparations 
Paints and Allied Products 
Gum and Wood Chemicals 
Fertilizers 
Fertilizers, Mixing only 
Agricultural Chemicals, Nee 
Adhesives and Gelatin 
Explosives 
Printing Ink 
Car bon Black 
Chemical Preparations, Nee 
Electric Measuring Instruments 
Transformers 
Switchgear and Switchboard Apparatus 
Motors and Generators 
Industrial Controls 
Welding Apparatus 
Carbon and Graphite Products 
Electrical Industrial Apparatus, Nee 
Household Cooking Equipment 
Household Refrigerators and Freezers 
Household Laundry Equipment 
Electric Housewares and Fans 
Household Vacuum Cleaners 
Sewing Machines 
Household Appliances, Nee 
SIC Code 
3641 
3642 
3643 
3651 
3652 
3661 
3662 
3671 
3672 
3673 
3674 
3679 
3691 
3692 
3693 
3694 
3699 
3711 
3714 
3713 
3715 
3721 
3722 
3729 
3731 
3732 
3741 
3742 
3751 
3791 
3799 
Industry Name 
Electric Lamps 
Lighting Fixtures 
Current-Carrying Wiring Devices 
Radio and TV Receiving Sets 
Phonograph Records 
Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
Radio and TV Communications 
Equipment 
Electron Tubes, Receiving Type 
Cathode Ray Picture Tubes 
Electron Tubes, Transmitting 
Semiconductors 
Electronic Components, Nee 
Storage Batteries 
Primary Batteries, Dry and Wet 
X-ray Apparatus and Tubes 
Engine Electrical Equipment 
Electrical Equipment, Nee 
Motor Vehicles 
118 
Motor Vehicle,Parts and Accessories 
Truck and Bus Bodies 
Truck Trailers 
Aircraft 
Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts 
Aircraft Equipment, Nee 
Ship Building and Repairing 
Boat Building and Repairing 
Locomotives and Parts 
Railroad and Street Cars 
Motocycles, Bicycles, and Parts 
Trailer Coaches 
Transportation Equipment, Nee 
APPENDIX B 
DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF INDEPENDENT 
AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
119 
120 
The variables used in the regression model and the sources of the 
data are listed below: 
PM= Price-cost margin expressed in per cent. Source: U. S. 
PM d' 
a J 
Bureau of the Census. Census ~Manufacturers, 1221· 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. 
= Adjusted price-cost margin expressed in per cent. Source·: 
U. S. Bureau .of the Census. Census .2,.f Manufacturers, .!.2.§2. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. 
CR Four-firm seller concentration ratio 
Source: U. s. Bureau of the Census. 
1222· Washington, D.C.: Government 
Chapter 9. 
expressed in per cent. 
Census of Manufacturers, 
Printing Office, 1971, 
D = Rate of growth in industry expressed 
Source: U. s. Bureau of the Census. 
1222· Washington, D.C.: Government 
Chapter 1. 
in per cent. 
Census .Q.f Manufacturers, 
Printing Office, 1971, 
MESl Smallest establishment size class which increased its share 
of value-added. by 1 per cent or more between 1963 and 1967 
expressed as a per cent of total industry sales. Source: 
U. S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Manufacturers, 1221· 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. 
MES2 Output of the average size plant, for the largest employment-
size category, expressed as a per cent of total industry 
sales. Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census. Census of 
Manufacturers, 1221· Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1971. 
MESJ Output of the average size plant, among the .largest plants 
which account for 50 per cent of industry output, expressed 
as a per cent of total industry sales. Source: U. S. 
Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1222· 
Washington 9 D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. 
PRD = Industry advertising to industry sales ratio expressed in 
per cent for SIC 20. Source: Gary A. Marple and Harry B. 
Wissman, editors, Grocery Manufacturing in~ United 
States (New York, 1968), p. 590. For industries outside 
SIC 20 (and for SIC 20 in the models examining all 115 
industries) a dummy product differentiation variable is used 
with produce goods industries = 0 and consumer .goods 
industries = 1. Source: Boa:rd of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Industrial Production l2Zl Edition. 
Washington, D.C.: Publications Services, 1972, pp. 5-14. 
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GM = Geographic market index. It is defined as the radius within 
which 80 per cent of the total tonnage of a four-digit 
industry is shipped. Source: Leonard W. Weiss, "The 
Geographic Size of Markets in Manufacturing," Review .2f. 
Economics~ Statistics, 54 (February, 1972), pp. 255-257. 
I = Import competition .dummy variable. When imports are greater 
than 1 per cent of total industry sales, I = 1; when imports 
are less than 1 per cent of total industry sales, I = 0. 
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. §_. Commodity Exports 
~ Imports M Related to Output, 1968 and 1..2.§1. Washington, 
D.C.:! Government Printing Office, 1971. 
KO = Capital to output ratio expressed in per cent •. Source: 
U. s.: Bureau of the Census, Q. §_. Census of Manufacturers, 
1..2.§1.: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. 
TAO Total asset to output ratio expressed in per cent. Source: 
U. S. Bureau of Census. Enterprise Statistics: 1221· 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973. 
APPENDIX C 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
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CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE MAIN VARIABlES, SIC 20, 1967 
PM PM d. CR D PRD MES1 MES2 MESJ I KO TAO GM 
a J 
PM 1.0 .98~ .606 .153 .663 
-373 .566 -531 -.006 .307 -~90 -.095 
PM d" 1.0 .6~1 .137 .691 -396 -591 ~57~ .017 .317 .519 ,....083 a J 
CR 1.0 -.07~ 
-391 -~98 -73~ -7~3 .131 .160 .202 -.173 
D 1.0 .221 .059 -.0~2 -.006 -.302 -.237 -.03~ .120 
PRD 1.0 .)12 -~71 
-357 -.159 .021 .0~2 .036 
MES1 1.0 .6~8 
-739 -.083 .295 .18~ -.098 
MES2 1.0 .867 .030 .208 .173 .039 
MESJ 1.0 .035 .289 .283 .013 
I 1.0 .03~ .292 .519 
KO 1.0 .522 -.090 
TAO 1.0 .053 
GM 1.0 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE MAIN VARIABLE 1 SIC 28 1 1967 
PM PM d" CR D PRD MES1 MES2 MES3 I KO TAO GM 
a J 
PM 1.0 0.79 0.11 -0.15 o.4o6 -0.17 -0.09 -0.19 -0.34o 0.10 0.23 0.06 
PM d" LO 0.25 0.07 0.23 -0.27 -0.03 0.02 0.21 0.09 0.09 -o.o4o 
a J 
CR 1 .. 0 -b.o8 -0.12' 0.01 0.56 0.65 0.15 o.4o9 o.4o7 0.17 
D 1.0 0.23 -0.08 0.26 0.32 0.12 -0.34o -0.15 -0.20 
PRD 1.0 0.11 0.03 -0.09 -0.4,2 -0.4o3 0.06 o.oo 
ffiS1 1.0 -0.08 o.oo -0.02 -0.10 0.24o 0.11 
ffiS2 1.0 o.83 0.)2 0.11 0.23 0.10 
MES3 1.0 0.25 0.18 0.22 0.18 
I 1.0 0.22 -0.11 0.14o 
KO 1.0 0.52 0.11 
TAO 1.0 0.09 
GM 1.0 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE MAIN VARIABLES, SIC 36, 1967 
PM PM . 
adJ 
CR D PRD MESI MES2 MES3 I KO TAO GM 
PM 1.0 0.87 0.~8 0.16 -0.05 o.~~ 0.39 0.37 0.18 0.15 0.08 -0.09 
PM . 
adJ 
1.0 0.56 0.15 0.03 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.18 0.11 0.0~ -0.02 
CR 1.0 o.o~ 0.18 0.53 0.~9 0.60 0.33 o.~3 0.26 -0.30 
D 1.0 0.26 0.26 0.05 o.o~ o.o~ 0.06 0.11 0.11 
PRD 1.0 0.12 0.37 0.~2 -0.03 -0.20 0.11 0.10 
MES1 1.0 0.5~ o.6o 0.05 0.12 0.01 -0.01 
~S2 1.0 0.93 0.01 0.16 0.19 0.16 
MES3 1.0 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.10 
I 1.0 0.15 0.30 -0.19 
KO 1.0 0.31 -0.03 
TAO "" 1.0 0.20 
GM 1.0 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE MAIN VARIABLES, SIC 37~ 1967 
PM PM d" CR D PRD MES1 MES2 MES3 I KO TAO GM 
a J 
PM 1.0 0.94 0.33 -0.16 0.01 0.08 0.66 0.64 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.54 
PM d. 1.0 0.48 -O.lJ -0.08 0.17 
a J 
0.78 0-77 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.45 
CR 1.0 -0.38 -0.24 0.25 0.55 0.62 -0.12 -0.29 -0.19 0.50 
D 1.0 0.38 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.37 -0.08 -0.12 -0.55 
PRD 1.0 0.29 -0.13 -0.22 0.15 0.21 -0.32 -0.13 
MES1 1.0 0.29 0.13 0.21 0.15 -0.16 0.21 
MES2 1.0 0.97 0.04 o.u 0.13 0.29 
MES3 1.0 0.04 0.14 0.10 o.43 
I 1.0 0.26 0.19 -o.o6 
KO 1.0 0.93 -0.35 
TAO 1.0 -0.37 
GM 1.0 
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